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ABSTRACT
THE INFLUENCE OF INCENTIVES OFFERED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO
PRIVATE DEVELOPERS OR LAND OWNERS ON THE RATE OF
BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT
Erik Benjamin Simon
Redevelopment of brownfield sites has become increasingly popular since the
inception of voluntary cleanup programs in the early to mid 1990’s. Local governments
have begun to offer incentives to private developers or land owners to offset costs
associated with contamination and encourage the redevelopment of properties that are
typically underutilized. Incentives may take several forms including, but not limited to,
fast-tracked project approval, risk based cleanup standards, liability relief, tax breaks, and
direct funding assistance.
This study investigates how incentives that are offered by local governments to
private developers or land owners influence the rate of redevelopment in their sphere of
influence. A survey was administered to local governments throughout the State of
California to determine how incentives are used for the redevelopment of brownfields.
Results from this study show a preference by participating local governments to offer
direct funding assistance, which may be directly linked to a relative level of inexperience.

Keywords: brownfield, incentive, redevelopment, local government, private developer,
land owner.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This study investigates how incentives offered by local governments to private
developers or land owners influence the rate of brownfield redevelopment within their
sphere of influence. Federal and state level environmental policies have been created, in
principle, to help protect natural resources and our earth’s environment from harmful acts
by humans, which affects the redevelopment of brownfield properties. Given this
constraint, local governments are increasingly responsible for creating their own policies
that not only include cleanup of environmentally effected sites, but also include
guidelines and programs with the intention of attracting private investment to the
redevelopment of brownfield sites (DeSousa, 2006). Private redevelopment of brownfield
sites continues to be an attractive development option in the face of uncertainty with
levels of contamination and increasing measures of required remediation by federal, state,
and local municipalities (Page & Rabinowitz, 1994). Redevelopment of brownfield sites
is being increasingly promoted by local governments that are providing incentive
packages to private developers or land owners in order to attract development investment
within their sphere of influence (Alberini, Longo, Tonin, Trombetta, & Turvani, 2005,
DeSousa, 2006).
Brownfields are defined by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) as “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). The EPA estimates that
there are approximately half a million industrial brownfield sites throughout the United
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States that have the potential for redevelopment projects. The majority of these sites are
privately owned resulting in the decision to redevelop lying solely on the landowner. In
many cases, this decision occurs at the time when the landowner would like to sell the
property.
Research Question and Hypotheses
Private development companies have begun to initiate redevelopment of
brownfield projects where past development would typically have required some form of
mandate from federal, state, or local government (Meyer & Lyons, 2000). The increasing
reliance on incentive packages offered by local governments to promote the
redevelopment of brownfield sites has led to this investigation on their effectiveness.
How do incentives that are offered by local governments to private developers or land
owners influence the rate of brownfield redevelopment? Although the decision to invest
in industrial brownfield redevelopment projects by private companies has historically
been based on issues of liability, research has shown that incentives such as reduction of
regulatory burden and subsidies can significantly influence the rate of redevelopment
(Alberini et al., 2005). This study is centered on a hypothesis that different types of
incentives positively affect the rate of redevelopment. Five independent types of
incentives are researched in this study; 1) fast-tracked or streamline application review
process, 2) risk based cleanup standards, 3) liability relief or indemnification from future
site cleanup, 4) tax breaks, and 5) direct funding assistance.
Findings are presented from an administered survey to local governments in the
State of California that have authority to offer incentive packages as a means of
promoting investment in brownfield redevelopment. The dependent variable of this study
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is the rate of brownfield redevelopment within a participating local government’s sphere
of influence. The independent variables of this study that influence the rate of
redevelopment are the five different types of incentives. Additional contextual variables
exist the may affect the independent variables as well as the dependent variable. The
contextual variables are separated by demographics and other key elements affecting the
brownfield redevelopment process. Connections between the contextual variables and
independent variables are measured to determine how they may influence the incentive
packages that are created for brownfield redevelopment. Connections between the
independent variables and the dependent variables are measured to determine how
incentives influence the rate of redevelopment.
Stakeholders of an industrial brownfield project can include property owners,
regulators, consultants, lenders, city/county planners, economic development
agencies/authorities, politicians, developers, real estate agents, academics/students,
lawyers, and surrounding communities (Lang & McNeil, 2004). This study focuses on
two main groups of stakeholders; private developers or land owners and local
governments. Results of this study are useful to these two main groups of stakeholders in
showing how incentives offered by local governments influence the rate of
redevelopment within their sphere of influence. Benefits to private developers or land
owners may include knowledge that targets specific redevelopment projects resulting in
higher returns on investment. Local governments may benefit from this study by gaining
information regarding how other similar entities engage private developers or land
owners to promote redevelopment of brownfield sites. Deductions from this proposed
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study can be used in an applied manner to future considerations of investment into
brownfield redevelopment projects by the different stakeholder groups.
Presuppositions
A presupposition that private land owners are primarily responsible for the
decision to invest in the redevelopment of brownfields.
The decision to redevelop privately held brownfield lands, excluding sites with
extenuating public safety and health risks, rests solely with the land owner. Even in cases
where federal level policies mandate remediation of contaminated lands, redevelopment
to a highest and best use is not always required. Private development companies or land
owners choose to invest in brownfield redevelopment projects for several reasons
including, but not limited to lower land costs, use of existing infrastructure, ecological
and public health impacts or government mandated cleanup measures (Howland, 2003;
Greenberg, Lowrie, Mayer, Miller & Solitare, 2001; DeSousa, 2006). Private developers
or land owners may also be influenced by incentives for brownfield redevelopment that
are offered by local governments. Alberini et al. (2005) examine market based incentives
offered to private development companies with the intention of promoting environmental
remediation and reuse of brownfields and how these incentives, along with regulatory
relief, can influence land use. Research is silent on whether or not the offering of
incentives to private development companies for brownfield redevelopment increases the
amount of projects within that municipal government’s sphere of influence.
A presupposition that private developers or land owners who chose to invest in
brownfield redevelopment require incentives to offset the costs associated with
contamination.
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Many locations of brownfields present an opportunity to rehabilitate
neighborhoods suffering from economic hardship, blight, and general disrepair
(Dennison, 1998, Meyer & Lyons, 2000, Greenberg et al., 2001). Despite the potential for
revitalization, challenges with technical issues of remediation and general liability
typically restrict local governments from undertaking significant brownfield
redevelopment projects (Hird, 1993). In addition, costs associated with remediation of
contaminated lands generally make redevelopment a less desirable option for many
private developers or land owners.
The strict enforcement of liability stemming from CERCLA in the early 1980’s
has cultivated a sense of fear in potential brownfield investors and has caused them to shy
away from becoming involved with the redevelopment of contaminated sites (Reger,
1998). Voluntary cleanup programs were established in the early 1990’s in an attempt to
expedite remediation and redevelopment of contaminated sites (Greenberg et al., 2001).
Several other programs initiated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
after CERCLA, including the Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative,
Brownfields Action Agenda, and the Brownfields National Partnership, were introduced
mainly for the purpose of offsetting remediation costs and to provide incentives for
brownfield redevelopment (Lowham, 2007).
A presupposition that incentives offered by local governments to private
developers or land owners increase the rate of brownfield redevelopment.
The redevelopment of brownfield sites is becoming increasingly popular with
private development entities for several reasons including, but not limited to prime
market conditions surrounding the reuse of existing sites and the increased involvement
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by local governments who have historically been risk averse by staying away from
complex redevelopments involving contamination (Goldstein, 2003). This increased
involvement by local governments is typically recognized through incentives offered to
private developers or land owners for redevelopment that meets the needs of all
stakeholders. Incentives associated with the redevelopment of brownfield sites are
designed to have positive effects through fostering development activities and have
demonstrated their effectiveness (Alberini et al., 2005, Goldstein, 2003).
These three presuppositions create a framework in which this study investigates
how incentives offered by local governments influence the rate of brownfield
redevelopment. The literature review provides further background on the history,
processes and outcomes of brownfield redevelopment. Incentives investigated in this
study are presented and explained through research.
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II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Brownfields Background
Targeted revitalization of contaminated lands is a relatively young phenomenon.
Looking at the history and evolution of brownfields and their redevelopment shows how
private developers and land owners have undergone a paradigm shift of avoidance to that
of pursuit. The catalyst of this paradigm shift is incentive packages that are offered by
federal, state, and local governments to private developers and land owners for the
redevelopment of contaminated lands. This process is one of trial and error.
Post World War II industrialization was a transitional time for America. During
the decades following the war, many companies sought to increase their operations and
began migrating to new areas, ending the use of existing facilities and abandoning the
original site in many cases (DeSousa, 2005, Lowham, 2007). Many of these abandoned
sites have contaminants from previous uses, one of the characteristics causing them to be
classified as brownfields. It is estimated that there are approximately 500,000 brownfield
sites throughout the United States (Simons, 1999); however, some estimates have reached
over one million such sites (Wedding & Crawford-Brown, 2007). The abandonment and
hazardous condition of many sites can contribute to economic hardship, poor aesthetics,
and apparent lack of concern for human health in areas already considered blighted.
Given these conditions, most brownfield sites are not historically considered to be
attractive investment options to private development companies (Howland, 2003).
Little attention was typically given to the negative conditions of most
contaminated sites until 1978, when the situation at Love Canal sparked national interest.
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Love Canal is a 36 square block neighborhood located in upstate New York near Niagara
Falls used as a dumping ground for toxic waste in the 1940’s and 1950’s by a chemical
manufacturing company. The buried contaminants of the site eventually leached out and
are believed to have caused significant health problems for residents of the area (Maugh,
1982). This became an international media frenzy resulting in President Jimmy Carter’s
declaration of Federal Emergency on August 7, 1978. The declaration resulted in the
relocation of residents closest to the contamination (UB Love Canal Collections, 2008).
Although there had been other national incidents involving human health and
contaminated sites, the Love Canal incident raised national awareness of an issue that
needed to be addressed.
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) on December 11, 1980 largely in response to the Love
Canal incident (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). This law, commonly
referred to as Superfund, provides measures for chemical and petroleum producing
companies to be taxed and grants federal authorities the power to protect human health
and environment. The Superfund program got off to a very slow start for several reasons,
mainly because it was a new and untested program. The lack of technical knowledge
surrounding remediation techniques for contaminated lands was another key reason for
the slow start (deSaillen, 1993). Over 1.5 billion dollars was collected within a five year
period from Superfund’s inception, with the money being directed to a trust fund for
cleaning up sites that have contaminants, but that proved to be insufficient (U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). Funds were exhausted by 1985, which led to
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, increasing funds
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through property tax and providing for studies and research of new technologies aiding in
the cleanup of brownfield sites (deSaillen, 1993).
The mandates of CERCLA have been stern since its inception in 1980. CERCLA
sets stringent liability standards where the government only needs to prove any past
involvement with a contaminated site rather than direct responsibility for its
contamination (Reger, 1998). CERCLA recognizes four categories of potential
responsible parties that can be held liable for cleanup and remedial action of any potential
damage that is done to natural resources. These categories include (1) the current owners
or operators of the site, (2) any past owners that may have contributed to waste or
hazardous disposal of materials, (3) generators of any hazardous substances related by
contract to site operations, and (4) any transporters of hazardous substances to and from
the site (Sundar & Grossman, 2003). CERCLA sometimes reaches beyond the confines
of these four categories and in some extreme cases, lenders who have foreclosed on
contaminated properties have been held liable for cleanup costs (Fogleman, 1992,
Lowham, 2007). The rigorous enforcement of liability has cultivated fear in land owners
and potential private investors, causing them to shy away from becoming involved with
the redevelopment of contaminated sites. In addition, extensive legal battles in court over
liability delays site remediation activities, as well as create negative connotations
associated with Superfund sites (Lowham, 2007). The litigious nature of CERCLA and
its slow initial results have raised concerns over its effectiveness and questions its
fundamental focus being on the remediation of contaminated sites.
Individual states began to develop voluntary cleanup programs (VCP) in the early
to mid 1990’s in response to the perceived ineffectiveness of CERCLA. VCP’s were
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initially pursued because of a lack of funding for the remediation of a large number of
contaminated sites (Alberini, 2007). VCP’s also offer an opportunity to expedite
remediation and redevelopment of underutilized land (Greenberg et al., 2001). Each state
is autonomous in developing their VCP but the initial framework for programs allow the
state to maintain control over plan approval and site development while setting up a
Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) with the EPA. After all parties agree to the MoA for
the state’s VCP, the state has complete control over remediation plans for the
contaminated site and redevelopment projects move forward in an expedited manner.
These programs led to third party entities, not associated with the cause of the
contamination, to remediate the site according to the MoA and alleviate the liability of
the property owner through property transfer and required reporting techniques
(Maldonado, 1996). This arrangement allows for a win-win situation where a third party
entity profits from completing remediation activities, the land owner reduces their
liability, and the local government and community benefits from redevelopment of a
previously underutilized site that was once contaminated. Another benefit of this situation
is that local governments and communities benefit from revitalized neighborhoods and
revenue from tax streams. In response to growing interest, several other programs
initiated by the EPA during this time were introduced mainly for the purpose of offsetting
remediation costs and to provide incentives for brownfield redevelopment (Lowham,
2007). These programs include the Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative,
Brownfields Action Agenda, and the Brownfields National Partnership.
Congress’ passing of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act of 2002, commonly known as the Brownfields Act, reflects this
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emerging direction in remediation of brownfield sites (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2008). This act combines two earlier pieces of federal legislation; the
Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act and the Small Business
Liability Act. The new legislation’s intent is to clarify ambiguity around remaining
liability issues and provide monetary assistance for site assessment and remediation
(Schefski, 2003). The Brownfields Act also requires states to adhere to its provisions in
order to receive federal funding aiding with their voluntary cleanup programs. To date,
this is the most comprehensive legislation regarding remediation and redevelopment of
industrial brownfields.
Changes in legislation have created a more hospitable environment for private
developers and land owners to invest in the redevelopment of brownfield sites.
Brownfield redevelopment opportunities are increasing since the mid 1990’s and as such,
the motivation and reasons for such investments continue to evolve. Economic viability is
just one value driver among other reasons to invest in brownfield redevelopment.
Reasons for Brownfield Redevelopment
As the availability of raw, unspoiled lands became increasingly scarce, greater
attention was paid to the redevelopment of lands that had already been prepared for
commercial, residential, and other uses. By the turn of the twenty-first century, growing
concern and interest in environmental matters reached into all walks of life and
institutions as influential and diverse as the Bank of America and the Roman Catholic
Church called for closer scrutiny of land use patterns (Swartz & Vieweg, 2000).
Redevelopment of property, as opposed to new development, is becoming more attractive
to private developers and land owners for several reasons. Further, the evolving
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regulatory approaches to redevelopment of contaminated lands continue to open doors of
opportunity to brownfield sites (Goldstein, 2003).
There are several shared reasons why both local governments and private
developers or land owners desire the redevelopment of brownfield sites. Economic
vitality is a common goal for both entities. The use of existing infrastructure offers lower
capital contributions from private developers or land owners and provides for a more
efficient use of tax dollars in maintaining or upgrading existing systems (Deason, Sherk,
& Carroll, 2001, Swartz & Vieweg, 2000). The reduction of potential risks to human
health from contamination is a priority of all local governments and also benefits private
developers and land owners by reducing their exposure to future liabilities (Greenberg et
al., 2001, Howland, 2003). Other reasons for pursuing redevelopment of brownfield sites
may be independently associated with local governments, private developers, or land
owners; however, there is sufficient overlap of these reasons to foster public support.
The pursuit of economic viability is a presupposition to any development project
by a private entity. Private developers or land owners that choose to invest in the
redevelopment of brownfield sites can benefit from lower land costs (DeSousa, 2006,
Goldstein, 2003). Incentive packages offered by federal, state, and local governments
contribute to reducing overall development costs and increase bottom line profits. Many
brownfield sites are located in desirable development locations, increasing their
attractiveness to private investors (Bacot & O’Dell, 2006, DeSousa, 2006). Utilizing
existing lands promotes infill development, reduces the expansion of urban sprawl, and
aligns with most local government interests (Greenberg et al., 2001).
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Local governments promote the reuse of previously developed land for several
reasons. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the reduction of urban sprawl
through infill development, environmental justice recognized through revitalization of
previously damaged lands, protection of ecological resources, and in several cases,
achieving social justice in demographic areas that may have been previously neglected
(Alberini et al., 2005, Swartz & Vieweg, 2000). Local governments and their respective
communities also benefit from redevelopment of certain brownfield sites with the
creation of jobs and tax revenue. A survey of 148 cities in 2003 showed that 576,373 new
jobs were created and nearly two billion dollars in annual tax revenues were received
through the redevelopment of brownfield sites (US Conference of Mayors, 2003). Local
governments may not always initiate the redevelopment of brownfield projects; however,
in most cases they are typically very receptive to the reuse of underutilized lands.
Collaborative efforts between private development entities and non-governmental
community organizations illustrate the ability to impact the outcome of brownfield
redevelopment projects that benefit all stakeholders (Gallagher & Jackson, 2008). As the
evolution of environmental and economic policies surrounding brownfield redevelopment
have increased the participation in such projects by private developers and landowners,
there is an increase in economic value drivers; not only for the private sector but for the
local government stakeholders as well (Alberini, 2007). The increased popularity of
brownfield redevelopment projects feeds the evolution of federal and state policies and
incentive packages that are offered to private developers and land owners. It is critical to
understand the evolution of these polices and how they could potentially affect future
brownfield redevelopment.
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Policies Surrounding Brownfield Redevelopment
The concept of brownfield redevelopment is less than thirty years old, which
provides a relatively short window of observation for assessing long term effects of
policy. CERLA set an arduous baseline standard for policy that proved to be ineffective
in reaching common goals between local governments and private developers or land
owners. A paradigm shift in policy has occurred over the last thirty years that fosters
support from all participating entities and gives hope to resolving existing challenges
with brownfield redevelopment under current environmental policies. Most current
policies affecting brownfield redevelopment are commonly termed “smart growth”.
Most of the published literature surrounding industrial brownfield redevelopment
focuses on factors such as site assessment, liability and regulatory measures, and other
key challenges facing private development companies and local governments (DeSousa,
2005). Case studies are well documented through literature, discussing programs or
policies used by government entities to attract and/or promote brownfield redevelopment.
However, a consistent disparity in the literature is the lack of a clear definition of what
constitutes a successful brownfield redevelopment project (Lang & McNeil, 2004). Each
brownfield project has a unique set of characteristics and deserves an independent
measurement of success. Efforts have been made toward the definition of uniform
success measurements (DeSousa, 2005, Lang & McNeil, 2004, Wedding & CrawfordBrown, 2007); however, there is no clear consensus at this time on a singular definition.
This lack of uniformity presents a challenge in proposing a single policy or program that
could cover all brownfield cases. Furthermore, stakeholders generally have diverse
interests with some groups more concerned about achieving successful remediation and
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redevelopment, while other groups focus on socioeconomic needs of affected
communities (McCarthy, 2002). Given this apparent diversity of interests, the three broad
goals of economic, environmental, and social justice are generally addressed separately,
or in some cases, paired with one but rarely embrace all three (DeSousa, 2005, Greenberg
et al., 2001). In many cases, the redevelopment of brownfield sites can be a winning
situation for both environmental and social justice goals as well as achieving some degree
of economic justice (Greenberg et al., 2001).
New literature surrounding brownfield redevelopment is beginning to merge the
three goals of economic, environmental, and social justice into one platform: smart
growth. Greenberg et al. (2001) makes a strong argument that redevelopment of industrial
brownfields contributes to smart growth policies. Growth regulation began with the
concept of restricting post World War II development activities into a union of market
preferences and social and environmental concerns by the early 1990’s (Anthony, 2008).
Increasing awareness of environmental concerns and limited effectiveness of previous
growth regulation policies led to the evolution of “smart growth” polices in the mid to
late 1990’s where the focus now included both environmental and social concerns
(Anthony, 2008, Greenberg et al., 2001). These policies continue to evolve with a focus
on reducing urban sprawl through urban infill and reducing potential health risks through
lowering carbon emissions. The increasing power of smart growth policies that affect
brownfield redevelopment has influenced legislation and increased monetary sources,
thereby creating economic opportunities for areas previously unused or underutilized
(Greenberg et al., 2001).
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Many brownfield locations present an opportunity to rehabilitate neighborhoods
suffering from economic hardship, blight, and general neglect (Dennison, 1998, Meyer &
Lyons, 2000, Greenberg et al., 2001). Despite the potential for revitalization, challenges
with technical issues of remediation and general liability typically restrict local
governments from undertaking significant brownfield redevelopment projects (Hird,
1993). The early CERCLA policy took a top-down approach towards contaminated
properties, with government playing the ultimate enforcer role and all other stakeholders
simply reacting to federal policy. However, recent and emerging attitudes towards
environmental policy guiding brownfield redevelopment promote a bottom-up approach.
The initiative to revitalize contaminated lands has resulted in federal, state, and local
governments providing financial incentives to private developers and land owners that
offset assessment and remediation costs (Gallagher & Jackson, 2008). This evolution
demonstrates how early polices regarded as failures because of inefficiency, cost
overruns, or unreasonable restrictions can evolve into successful long term policies (Day
& Johnson, 2004).
Recent policies require public knowledge and participation in federally funded
brownfield redevelopment programs to varying degrees per state (Gallagher & Jackson,
2008). Requiring public participation, along with other community outreach programs, is
a key element in ensuring that environmental and social justice is acknowledged and
achieves greater systemic support of brownfield redevelopment projects (Gallagher &
Jackson, 2008).
It is clear that the federal government is open to a state-governing approach
concerning the remediation of contaminated lands. The Uniform Environmental

16

Covenant Act of 2003 (UECA) is a pilot program currently enacted in twenty-three states
providing institutional controls and power to enforce environmental remediation (U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). UECA allows each participating state to
specify what those controls should be, what level of cleanup is appropriate, and liability
standards without replacing the existing regulatory framework (Uniform Environmental
Covenants Act, 2009). This arrangement demonstrates the federal government’s support
of federalism with respect to brownfield redevelopment.
The legislation affecting redevelopment of brownfield sites demonstrates how
collaborative efforts between federal, state, local, and private entities can be effective in
ensuring long term success with brownfield redevelopment projects. This paradigm shift
in policy, from a top-down to a bottom-up approach, underscores a stark contrast in
thinking over a relatively short period of time. This shift also supports and gives credit to
state governed voluntary cleanup programs, which are the primary mechanisms
controlling new brownfield redevelopment projects.
Voluntary Cleanup Programs
State run voluntary cleanup programs have been effective in fostering
redevelopment of brownfield sites and are instrumental in reducing fears of private
developers and land owners. Participation by independent states in these programs has
steadily increased since the first one was introduced in 1988. Despite increasing
popularity, VCP’s have shortcomings and continue to require monitoring and assessment
to reach their full potential.
Minnesota was the first state to develop a voluntary cleanup program in 1988 as a
way to alleviate the regulation and pressures of the stringent CERCLA law (State
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Legislatures, 1996). An unintended outcome of CERCLA was that most landowners
chose to abandon their contaminated properties rather than become involved in an
expensive and burdensome cleanup process. The introduction of voluntary cleanup
programs provides an attractive alternative that promotes reinvestment into these
underutilized lands (Alberini, 2007, State Legislatures, 1996). While some states adhere
to the stringent nature of CERCLA in the development of their voluntary cleanup
programs, others tend to relax their legal requirements and prioritize private sector
involvement with the remediation of contaminated lands. One of the underlying
motivations for states to create a voluntary cleanup program is the relief of liability that is
so rigorous under CERLA law (Sundar & Grossman, 2003). Private developers and land
owners have expressed fear of future liabilities, and in response to these expressed fears,
many states have signed MoA with the EPA that prohibit the EPA from further actions
against brownfield sites having completed state approved voluntary cleanup programs
(State Legislatures, 1996). The federal government remains empowered to enact
emergency responses but this potential relief from further liability represents a significant
step in bolstering voluntary cleanup programs throughout the nation.
Participation by private developers and land owners has been significant; by 2000,
over 90 percent of the states had their own version of a voluntary cleanup program (Lang
& McNeil, 2004, Alberini, 2007). Since the passage of the Brownfields Act in 2002, all
states have some form of a VCP. Participation in voluntary cleanup programs is
dependent on several variables including the size of the brownfield site, proximity to
residential areas, and the economic potential of development (Alberini, 2007). Because
participants in voluntary cleanup programs typically do so with brownfield sites that are
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not registered with the EPA, the level of contamination tends to be lower than EPA
registered sites (Alberini, 2007).
Although voluntary cleanup programs have increased in popularity, studies are
inconclusive about their effectiveness and unintended effects. Akinmoladun and Lewis
(1998) criticized the leniency of mandated cleanup standards, limitations on the property
owner’s civil liability for future cleanups, and the lack of comprehensive observation and
reporting over statewide site cleanups.
One prevalent effect of the popularity of voluntary cleanup programs has been an
increase of recognized or stated brownfield sites. Despite no uniform regulation requiring
the registration of brownfield sites, the quantity of existing brownfield sites across our
country is estimated to range between one half of a million to over one million (Simons,
1999, Wedding & Crawford-Brown, 2007). In some cases, the incentives stemming from
voluntary cleanup programs have caused owners of previously undocumented parcels of
contaminated land to come forward in attempts to receive benefits of the VCP’s
(Alberini, 2007). This effect can be viewed as a double edged sword; it is bringing
previously unknown contaminated properties to light while increasing the number of
private developers and land owners looking for incentives that are ultimately paid
through tax dollars (Alberini, 2007).
Certain states have taken measures for protection against companies that are
responsible for causing contamination and looking to enter a VCP as a means of
alleviating their own liability. Minnesota, along with several other states, will not extend
liability protection to parties that are responsible for causing the contamination
(Cavanagh, 1995). Responsible parties are not automatically precluded from participation
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in a state’s VCP; however, they may be subject to a higher degree of liability (Cavanagh,
1995). In a 2002 Illinois lawsuit, the insurers of a responsible party were not held
responsible for covering assessment and remediation costs of a responsible party after
entering into a VCP agreement (Hazardous Waste Consultant, 2003). The courts ruled
that the responsible party had entered into the VCP agreement on their own and that the
additional cleanup costs were federally or state mandated; therefore, sole responsibility of
additional cleanup costs remained with the responsible party.
Despite these unintended effects, VCP’s remain effective and continue to grow in
popularity. Rationale behind the creation of voluntary cleanup programs is rooted in
motivating private developers and land owners to take action towards remediation of
contaminated lands. In addition to remedial actions, private developers and land owners
are interested in redevelopment that will yield returns on their investment. The offering of
incentive packages help offset remediation costs and promote responsible redevelopment
projects, regardless of the level of contamination.
Incentive Packages
Each state has autonomy in the preparation of incentive packages aimed at
promoting the redevelopment of brownfield sites. Some incentives are directed towards
remediation and site cleanup efforts while others are directed towards economic
redevelopment through tax increment financing, property tax abatement, or tax credits for
job creation (Alberini, 2007). One might ask why the federal or state government does
not simply provide direct and complete funding for the cleanup of environmentally
impacted sites if that is truly the desired goal? Recall that such direct and complete
funding was one of the goals of CERCLA, but it failed to provide sufficient funding for
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all necessary remediation activities. It is not reasonable for public funding to cover all of
the cleanup costs, so the focus needs to turn to the potential efficiency that is recognized
through the receipt of incentives by the private sector (Swartz & Vieweg, 2000).
Studies in both Europe and the United States show that private developers and
land owners are apt to be more interested in the redevelopment of contaminated lands
when incentive packages are offered (Alberini et al., 2005). There is no set framework for
the creation of these incentive packages; however, three broad categories of incentives
are typically used as the foundation for most brownfields revitalization programs in each
state. These three categories are liability protection, regulatory relief, and financial
incentives (Alberini et al., 2005, Goldstein, 2003). Through voluntary cleanup programs,
each state has discretion in creating incentive packages so they meet the needs of each
stakeholders in a given project. Case studies show that previous experience with
brownfield redevelopment projects affects the priorities of private developers and land
owners. Lack of experience in brownfield redevelopment typically yields a strong desire
for liability relief while greater amounts of brownfield redevelopment experience
typically yield a strong desire for financial incentives (Alberini et al., 2005). It is
reasonable to assume that local governments have similar, but inverse preferences
directly relating to their level of brownfield redevelopment experience. Local
governments with less brownfield redevelopment experience will prefer to retain their
rights to enforce liability and offer funding assistance.
Financial incentives can take several forms and are generally seen through five
broad categories. These categories include (1) tax credits, (2) tax refunds, (3) low interest
loans, (4) loan guarantees, and (5) grants (Goldstein, 2003). The first four categories are
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available to private sector projects while federally funded grants are typically only
available to local government entities and in some cases, non-profit agencies (Goldstein,
2003). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of Housing &
Urban Development are two significant sources of grant funding for various activities of
brownfield and land revitalization (U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development,
2009, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2009).
Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credits and the Brownfield Job Program are two primary
financial tools used in the creation of incentive packages for private developers and land
owners. The Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit program offers a tax credit of 35 percent of
every dollar spent, up to $250,000 each year, towards the assessment and cleanup of
contaminated sites with a bonus of ten percent of the total cleanup costs up to $50,000
(Goldstein, 2003, Sundar & Grossman, 2003). The Brownfield Job Program offers a cash
tax refund of $2,500 per job created as long as the capital investment is at least $2 million
and ten or more jobs are created (Goldstein, 2003). All of these programs and financial
incentives can be utilized together to create a lucrative incentive for private developers or
land owners.
The effect of liability and liability relief can dramatically affect decisions
regarding brownfield redevelopment. In general, private developers and land owners will
prioritize liability protection; however, there are several situations where the threat of
liability will not hinder the redevelopment of brownfield sites. Financial solvency of
parties involved in land transactions has significant weight in determining whether or not
a private developer or land owner is willing to subject themselves to any further potential
liabilities (Segerson, 1993). Brownfield Site Rehabilitation Agreements can be created
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where the state will grant the private developer and lenders comprehensive liability
protection against cost recovery suits (Goldstein, 2003). The Small Business Liability
Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 revised guidelines to the Innocent
Landowners Defense and changed provisions for contiguous property owners so that
liability can be minimized in certain scenarios and foster the redevelopment of
brownfield sites (Collins, 2003, Sundar & Grossman, 2003). State and local governments
have shown willingness to relax liability standards to foster the redevelopment of
underutilized properties.
Similarly, streamlining the application process for brownfield redevelopment
offers regulatory relief (Lang & McNeil, 2004), thereby reducing the wait time before
engaging in redevelopment activities. Another example of regulatory relief is the use of
risk based corrective actions. Risk based corrective actions is a system of variable
cleanup standards set in proportion to the intended end land use (Alberini, 2007,
Goldstein, 2003). A variety of engineering and institutional control measures can be
utilized including, but not limited to, ground caps, fences, barriers (engineering controls),
permanent land use restrictions, and site monitoring (institutional controls) (Alberini,
2007). These engineering and institutional controls are site specific and could be used in
any combination for targeted locations corresponding directly to the proposed land use in
each area of the site.
Incentive packages can, by definition, influence the redevelopment of brownfield
sites; however, literature is silent on how this influence is measured. A presupposition of
offering incentive packages is an increase in redevelopment of contaminated lands.
Research has not shown what level of incentive is required or to what level brownfields
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will be redeveloped through the offering of incentives. As incentive packages continue to
evolve, monitoring their effectiveness and appropriate revisions to future incentive
packages is necessary to maintain and achieve value. Success measurements for
brownfield redevelopment projects are a challenging objective that is critical to the
further successful development of future incentive packages.
Measurements of Successful Brownfield Redevelopment
There is no standardized framework currently used by either public or private
entities for the measurement of successful redevelopment of brownfield sites. This is
primarily due to the fact that each brownfield site is unique in its defining characteristics
and surroundings. Success is viewed differently through the eye of the stakeholder and
can vary greatly between parties, even on the same brownfield project. Emerging
research has begun to create standardized metrics for the measurement of success in
brownfield redevelopment projects although there does not appear to be a unified
proposal for any type of universal metrics system at this time (De Sousa, 2005, Lang &
McNeil, 2004, Wedding & Crawford-Brown, 2007).
Lang and McNeil’s 2004 study began with an effort to capture identifying
conditions and attributes that could define a successful brownfield redevelopment project.
Two surveys were conducted; the first was a qualitative questionnaire asking
stakeholders to indicate their level of agreement with definable attributes, and the second
survey captured site specific information such as general location, existing infrastructure,
land description, building descriptions, and development climate (Lang & McNeil, 2004).
Results from Lang and McNeil’s study indicated that environmental remediation should
not be the primary focus of brownfield redevelopment projects and that outcomes of the
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development itself were of primary importance (Lang & McNeil, 2004). According to
survey results, the creation of long term jobs, new real estate and income tax bases, and
acreage to support on-site jobs were the top three outcomes that define successful
brownfield redevelopment (Lang & McNeil, 2004). This evidence supports the use of
cost/benefit analysis when prioritizing indicators of success when dealing with the
redevelopment of contaminated lands (Lang & McNeil, 2004, Wedding & CrawfordBrown, 2007); however, environmental factors cannot be dismissed. While economics is
of clear importance, it is environmental policy that has always been the driving factor
behind legislation affecting brownfield redevelopment (Bacot & O’Dell, 2006) and
therefore must be given equal consideration.
One of the greatest challenges in creating a standardized framework for
measurement of brownfield redevelopment success is the gathering of information. Since
each state is autonomous in the construction of development agreements, there is no
common thread between states in the collection of data that could be used as indicators of
success. Bacot and O’Dell (2006) suggest that there be a federal direction, most likely
from the EPA, for states to institute a standard framework of data collection that would
ensure uniformity and provide a good base of comparability in measurements of
brownfield redevelopment success. This suggestion offers a measurement of economic
and environmental indicators that can be used to assess the viability of government
sponsored programs (Bacot & O’Dell, 2006).
Wedding and Crawford-Brown (2007) suggest that greater weight be given to
aspects of sustainability when measuring success of a brownfield redevelopment. Vertical
development, (i.e. any development beyond site remediation and infrastructure), can
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represent more than 75 percent of total project costs and therefore deserve significant
representation in the measurement of success for the entire brownfield redevelopment
project (Wedding & Crawford-Brown, 2007). There is no known federal or state
brownfield incentive that is intended to support vertical construction only; however, some
incentive programs require a demonstration of public benefit and the end use of a project
be part of the analysis when determining a site appropriate incentive package (Wedding
& Crawford-Brown, 2007).
Several research efforts have produced great models of success measurements but
a unified standard does not exist. This lack of a standardized metrics system places a
greater responsibility on local governments to assess the effectiveness of incentive
packages that they offer. Continued work towards a unified success measurement system
for brownfield redevelopment will undoubtedly affect future incentive packages that are
offered to private developers or land owners.
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III.

METHOD

Research Design
In this study, I investigate how incentives offered by local governments to private
developers or land owners influence the rate of brownfield redevelopment within their
sphere of influence. The research effort does not manipulate any independent variables
affecting the dependent variable. Data is collected to reflect a longitudinal trend of
actions taken by local governments over a five year period. The goal is to determine how
incentives offered by local governments to private developer or land owners have
affected the rate of brownfield redevelopment within that local government’s sphere of
influence within a five year period. Gathered data is from a self-selected sample group
from the State of California and is inferred to represent the generalized trend or trends on
a broad level.
The basis of research design for this study is to investigate the potential
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, rate of
brownfield redevelopment. Independent variables for this research effort are defined as
five different types of incentives that a local government may offer to a private developer
or land owner to encourage the redevelopment of a brownfield site. The five independent
variables are:
1. Fast-tracked or streamlined application review process
2. Risk based cleanup standards
3. Liability relief or indemnification from future site cleanup
4. Tax breaks
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5. Direct funding assistance
The deductive manner of research attempts to show a nomothetic causal
relationship between each of the independent variables and the dependent variable. Other
contextual variables may affect the five types of incentives or the rate of redevelopment.
These additional contextual variables are separated into two groups. The first group of
contextual variables is demographics of the participating local government and is referred
to as demographic variables. The demographic variables are:
a. Population
b. Households
c. Median household income
d. Median house value
Each of these demographic variables is an indicator of potential resources that may
directly affect the rate of redevelopment. Each of these demographic variables is
correlated to the rate of redevelopment to investigate any potential relationships.
The remaining contextual variables are directly correlated to the five different
incentive types that affect the rate of brownfield redevelopment. Each of these contextual
variables is a key element in the brownfield redevelopment process and may significantly
influence how a local government creates incentive packages. The six contextual
variables are:
i. Any existing framework based on characteristics of a brownfield site that
may dictate the type and/or amount of incentive offered.
ii. Any funding assistance from the State of California applied to the
redevelopment of a brownfield site.
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iii. Any funding assistance from the Federal Government applied to the
redevelopment of a brownfield site.
iv. Local government taking the initiative to approach private developers or
land owners with an offer of incentives for the redevelopment of a
brownfield site.
v. Private developers or land owners approaching local government seeking
incentives for the redevelopment of a brownfield site.
vi. Local government having any environmental policies requiring stricter
cleanup standards than state or federal requirements.
Primary data gathered from a survey instrument is used to investigate
relationships between each of the demographic and contextual variables and the rate of
brownfield redevelopment. The contextual variables specifically related to the brownfield
redevelopment process are each compared directly to the five independent variables to
investigate any correlations affecting incentive packages.
The hypotheses of this study focus on how each of the five different incentive
types, or five independent variables, influence the rate of redevelopment. Two main
presuppositions support the hypotheses. The first presupposition is that private
developers or land owners are primarily responsible for the decision to invest in the
redevelopment of brownfield projects. The second presupposition is that incentives
offered by local governments will increase the rate of brownfield redevelopment.
Research and findings provide a generalized framework of how incentives offered by
local governments influence the rate of brownfield redevelopment within their sphere of
influence.
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Materials Used in Research
Research tool.
The research tool for this investigation is a survey. This is the most efficient
means of including the greatest number of participants given time and budget constraints.
The window of opportunity to develop and administer the survey mechanism is minimal
and minimizes future opportunities to conduct any interviews, observations, or field
measurements. Questions contained in the survey are designed to measure independent
and contextual variables in an attempt to correlate their outcomes to the rate of
redevelopment. There is no reason to hide intentions or manipulate questions and
responses to avoid potentially sensitive topics with the construction of the survey. Any
potential bias toward redevelopment outcomes is omitted from the research tool.
Delivery mechanism.
An internet based mechanism is the vehicle by which the survey is administered.
Ease of preparation, low cost, facilitated data management, and detailed reports with
integrated coding are the primary reasons for using an internet based survey. Survey
Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com) is a recognizable, online survey engine that many
local governments in the State of California are familiar with. The website offers secure
response tracking that many cities and local governments have used for other surveys. All
responses are gathered, coded and stored within the online mechanism and can be filtered
and downloaded into different types of reports helping to create a database.
Preparation of Research Materials
The design of the survey is constructed in three sections to account for the
dependent variable, independent variables, and contextual variables. Structure of the
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survey follows this format to put the most vital information at the beginning and accounts
for an expected decrease in interest as respondents advance through the survey (Dillman,
2000). The number of questions in each section range from eight to 12 with several
follow up or subsection questions. The total number of questions in the survey is 51 but a
respondent may answer as few as 31 questions depending on the answers provided. See
appendix 1 for brainstorm ideas, rough draft, and final draft of the survey.
The purpose of the demographics and baseline brownfield information section is
to gather identifying information from the participating local government as well as
quantitative information on the existing brownfields within their sphere of influence. The
key questions of this section identify how many brownfield sites are located within that
local government’s sphere of influence and how many of those sites have been
redeveloped. The offered responses to the question of how many brownfield sites are
located within the geographic region were aggregated into groupings of one to ten, 11 to
20, 21 to 50 and 51 or more so that respondents do not need to perform inordinate
amounts of investigation. The offered responses to how many of those brownfield sites
have been redeveloped are singular numbers between zero and four and then a choice of
five or more. The rationale behind this is that there are likely to be several brownfield
sites located within a given local government’s sphere of influence, some known and
some only speculated, but it is most likely that only a small fraction of those sites have
undergone redevelopment efforts (US Conference of Mayors, 2003).
The final version of the survey limits the number of demographic and baseline
brownfield information to only necessary information and moves quickly into questions
regarding incentive packages. Based on the hypotheses of this study, the incentive
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questions attempt to measure the independent variables of fast-tracked or streamlined
application review process, risk based cleanup standards, liability relief or
indemnification from future site cleanup, tax breaks, and direct funding assistance from
the participating local government. The incentive questions represent the main causal
thrust of the hypotheses and are placed as close to the beginning of the survey as possible
so that they would have a higher rate of participation.
Questions targeting incentive packages begin with asking whether or not the
participating local government has offered that type of incentive as part of any incentive
package for brownfield redevelopment. Yes or no answers allow for a bivariate analysis
of correlation to the determined rate of redevelopment. Participating local governments
that answer yes to any of the questions asking about each incentive type are asked to
provide additional information about how that specific type of incentive is used. The goal
is to determine how participating local governments use each type of incentive to foster
the redevelopment of brownfield sites within their sphere of influence.
Through literature research, incentive packages can be categorized into three
types; 1) financial, 2) liability relief, and 3) regulatory relief. Questions targeting at
financial incentives are separated between any type of tax breaks and any type of direct
funding assistance. The purpose of this separation is twofold. First, it allows for the
participating local government to differentiate between two types of funding sources
when answering the questions, and second, it provides insight into how aggressive the
participating local government is when pursuing brownfield redevelopment within their
sphere of influence. Only one question targets liability relief. Literature has shown that
private developers and land owners are concerned about the potential for liability of
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future site cleanup actions (Alberini et al., 2005). The rationale behind this question is to
identify how local governments use relief of liability and/or indemnification from future
site cleanups to encourage private developers or land owners to redevelop brownfield
sites. Questions targeting regulatory actions by the participating local governments are
separated into two types. The first type of regulatory relief is the offering of fast-tracked
or streamlined project review, and the second type is the offering of risk based corrective
actions. The purpose of separating these two categories is that these incentives are created
with different intentions. Fast-tracked or streamlined project review is based purely on
project approval time and risk based corrective actions are based in the relief of excessive
remedial actions.
The remaining questions of the survey focus on participation in brownfield
redevelopment, or contextual variables. Questions targeting state and/or federal
assistance are designed to gather information on how aid from a higher level of
government influences a local government’s actions. Specific details or amount of aid are
not collected; it is the presence of outside aid and its influence on a local government’s
creation of incentive packages that is of interest. Interactions between a local government
and private developer or land owner and other conditions such as stricter cleanup
standards may all influence the creation of incentive packages or the rate of brownfield
redevelopment itself. Questions regarding these contextual variables are placed toward
the end of the survey because they are not directed at the main causal thrust of the study.
Respondents are given an opportunity to provide open ended responses on their
reflections of lessons learned from previous brownfield redevelopment experiences. This

33

provides insight into valuable experience from practitioners who are engaged in daily
operations and have understanding of the challenges to brownfield redevelopment.
Participants
This research effort focuses on the State of California as a whole; therefore, all
forms of local government choosing to participate are welcome. Due to time and resource
constraints, the focus of this survey is directed towards city governments, whose contact
information is relatively easy to come by through the internet. There are 480 incorporated
cities and towns across 58 counties in the State of California (League of California Cities,
2009). There is no known central resource available to the public that would allow an
individual to contact all cities located in the State of California in a single action.
Different government entities such as California Environmental Protection Agency,
Office of the Governor, and the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research were all
contacted in an effort to obtain some form of a central contact point to disperse a request
of participation in this research effort. In addition, private and/or quasi public entities
such as the California Redevelopment Association and SCS Engineers (private
engineering firm with vast amounts of brownfield experience) were contacted as part of
the same effort. This effort began in October of 2008 and lasted through February of
2009 yielding no master list of any kind that would be useful in reaching out to all 480
California cities.
The League of California Cities is an association of city officials that share
knowledge and work together by exchanging information and combining resources. This
organization is well known throughout the State of California and has contact, in one
form or another, with nearly every city throughout the state. One of the services that the
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League of California Cities offer to its members is an online, collaborative messaging
system through emails known as listserves. City officials, staff and employees are free to
join a listserve of their choosing so that they can exchange information with all other
members. There are eight listserves; 1) administrative services, 2) community services, 3)
employee relations, 4) environmental quality, 5) finance officers, 6) housing, community
and economic development (HCED), 7) public safety, and 8) transportation,
communication, and public works. The listserves most closely related to issues
surrounding brownfield redevelopment are environmental quality, finance officers, and
HCED. The moderator of the listserves would not allow for any non-city member to join;
however, they were willing to send emails out on behalf of a graduate student doing
research closely related to city business. The environmental listserve has 785 members.
The financial officers has 821 members and the HCED listserve has 2,054 members. The
League of California Cities does not track how many cities are represented in these
numbers but is comfortable with estimating that approximately 65 to 70 percent of all
California cities are represented through the combination of these three different
listserves. In total, 3,660 city personnel, representing approximately 324 cites, were
contacted with a request to participate in this research effort.
The weakness of this method is the unknown number of contacts and inability to
ensure that the correct person is contacted. The listserves are property of the League of
California Cities; therefore, control of distribution and accurate tracking of contacted vs.
participating cities is forfeited when using them as a distribution method. The strength of
this distribution method is a consolidated contact source that requires minimal effort to
contact. The League of California Cities is a recognizable and trusted source of
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information for all member cities and it is reasonable to assume that recipients of the
request to participate in the survey do not immediately dismiss the email as junk. This
distribution method is the most efficient and reliable use of available resources given
time and money constraints.
Thirty-one local governments participated in the survey. Using 324 contacted
cities as the base number, the 31 participating local governments represents a 9.56%
response rate. This rate drops to 6.45% if considering all 480 California cities; however,
there is no guarantee or reasonable indication that all California cities have brownfield
sites within their sphere of influence. Cal/EPA estimates that there are 90,000 properties
in the State of California that “remain idle or underutilized because of real or perceived
environmental contamination” (Cal/EPA, 2009); however, there is no existing
determination of how those brownfield sites are dispersed across the state, nor are there
published measurements of how that figure was estimated. How many cities in the State
of California contain brownfield sites within their sphere of influence? A conservative
assumption of 85 percent yields a total of 408 cities, with the remaining 15 percent of
brownfield sites being located somewhere other than a California city’s sphere of
influence. Three hundred twenty-four cities represent 79.41% of all cities within the state
that potentially have brownfield sites within their sphere of influence and the revised
response rate now climbs to 7.59% of all potential cities. See appendix 3 for a list of
participating local governments and their respective locations.
The sample size of 31 local governments is too small to make a strong inference
of trends or relationships. Exact counts of brownfield sites and their relative sizes are the
only way to accurately determine the response rate of local governments. This precise
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information is not available so other comparisons must be made. Population of the
participating local governments compared to the State of California can be used as
another comparison of sample size.

Table 1
Demographic Comparison of Sample Population to State of California
Median City
Population

Median Income

Median House
Value

Sample Population

42,236

$44,540

$169,400

State of California

28,862

$47,493

$211,500

U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 and League of California Cities
Data Sets: Census 2000; Summary File 1 (SF 1), Table P1; Summary File 3 (SF 3), Tables P53 and H76
League of California Cities; All About Cities, Fast Facts

Table 1 shows a comparison of demographic variables between the sample
population and the State of California. Using gathered information from the 2000 census,
the combined population of the 31 participating local governments is 1,751,784. Total
population in the State of California is 33,871,648. The participating local governments
represent only 5.14% of the entire state’s population. Sample size drops significantly
lower when looking at representation of land area. Using statistics from Wikipedia, the
total land mass of all participating local governments is 600 square miles. The total land
mass of the State of California is 163,696 square miles. Participating local governments
represent less than one percent, 0.37%, of the total available land mass in the State of
California. These comparisons demonstrate the weakness of the collected sample size and
the inability to make strong inferences from the gathered information. The primary data
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allows only for generalized inferences of how incentives influence the rate of brownfield
redevelopment within the participating local government’s sphere of influence.
Identified Brownfield Sites
California’s Department of Toxic Substance Control (DTSC) maintains a
database of registered cleanup sites and permitted hazardous waste facilities across the
state. This database contains registered brownfield sites that are in various stages of
cleanup status. There are 832 brownfield sites, representing 53 counties on this list,
broken down by status and locations. The 31 respondents represent 20 different counties,
or 39.21% of the counties in California that have registered brownfield sites. Five
hundred four potential brownfield sites have been identified by the respondents using
aggregated response choices. This represents over 60 percent of the total registered
brownfield site population in California; however, there may be several more brownfield
sites that are not accounted for in the DTSC database. California EPA estimates that
there are approximately 90,000 brownfield sites in the state. The 832 registered sites
represent approximately less than one percent of that total potential brownfield site
population.
Protocol and Measurements
Aggregated answer choices are provided for the respondents for two reasons. The
first reason is for each of answering in an attempt to increase survey participation. The
second reason is to provide ranges of answers to questions for which local governments
may not have precise information. Not all brownfield sites are registered with state or
federal government and research has shown that there are potentially thousands of sites
across the State of California that may not be accounted for. Aggregated answer choices
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provide the most efficient means of collecting information given constraints on time and
information. Unfortunately, aggregated answer choices make it impossible to identify an
accurate percentage of total brownfield site representation by the respondents.
Data from the survey is input into a database that allows descriptions and
correlations to be made. See appendix 4 for complete database information. Descriptive
statistics and correlations are most appropriate given the sample size and amount of
information collected. Insufficient information was gathered to perform a multivariate
regression analysis showing influences of each independent variable to the rate of
redevelopment. In addition to the information gathered from the survey, demographic
statistics from the 2000 census is entered into the database so that correlations between
variables a, b, c, and d and the rate of redevelopment can be analyzed.
The rate of redevelopment for each respondent is calculated by taking the number
of redeveloped brownfield sites and dividing by the indicated number of brownfields
located within their sphere of influence. Answer choices for the number of redeveloped
sites are used as the numerator in calculating the rate of redevelopment. For answer
choice “five or more”, five is used as the numerator. Since aggregated answer choices are
provided for the number of brownfield sites, the midpoint of each grouping is used as the
denominator in the equation. For respondents having 51 or more sites, 51 is used as the
denominator. The mean rate of redevelopment is calculated by summing all of the
responses for number of redeveloped sites and dividing by the sum of all answer choices
for the number of brownfield sites.
Each respondent is given a rank for their rate of redevelopment, with identical
rates sharing the same rank. Two or more respondents sharing the same rank leads to
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statistical insignificance when attempting to perform correlations. The rate of
redevelopment, as opposed to the rank will lead to stronger generalizations of influences
and trends. Corresponding demographic information is input into the database so that
correlations could be made between the rate of redevelopment and values of population,
households, median household income, and median house value. The remaining six
contextual variables are input into a correlation database with binary answers only; zero
representing a “no” answer and one representing a “yes” answer.
Bivariate analysis between the different variables using Pearson’s correlation is
the most effective means of determining measures of association given the information
that is gathered. Measures of association that this study attempts to identify include:
•

Demographic information to rate of redevelopment

•

Correlations between the five independent variables

•

Each independent variable to the rate of redevelopment

•

Contextual variables to each independent variable

•

Contextual variables to the rate of redevelopment

In addition to each of these correlations, a chi squared test is calculated to determine the
accuracy in predicting the order of pairs of cases between incentives/no incentives and
redevelopment/no redevelopment.
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IV.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Results of the survey provide an insight to how incentives offered by local
governments to private developers or land owners influence the rate of redevelopment.
There were 31 participating local governments, representing less than eight percent of the
available population. This size of the sample and low representation of total population
allows only for generalizations to be made on how these incentives work within the State
of California.
Rate of Redevelopment – Dependent Variable
A baseline rate of redevelopment was established by calculating results from two
independent questions; 1) How many brownfield sites exist within your local
government’s sphere of influence, and 2) How many brownfield sites have been
redeveloped within your sphere of influence over the last five years? Both questions had
aggregated answer choices to help respondents identify qualifying brownfield sites to the
best of their ability. The Brownfields Act of 2002 requires brownfield sites to be
registered, but comprehensive information is not completely available to all local
governments at this time. No information was gathered on whether or not these
brownfield sites are registered with the state or how participating local government
identifies brownfield sites.
Figure 1 shows the number of brownfield sites that were identified in each local
government’s sphere of influence. The reported number of brownfield sites provides one
half of the information required to establish a baseline rate of redevelopment. Over 50
percent of the respondents indicated that there were ten or less brownfield sites located
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within their sphere of influence. Three respondents, representing less than ten percent of
the entire sample, indicated that there were no brownfield sites located within their sphere
of influence. The remaining 12 respondents indicated that there were 11 or more
brownfield sites located within their sphere of influence. The reported number of
brownfield sites provides one half of the information required to establish a baseline rate
of redevelopment. The frequency of responses that indicate a low number of brownfield
sites, ten or less, implies that the associated local government may not be aware of
additional brownfield sites within their sphere of influence. This may also be an indicator
of minimal levels of experience that participating local governments have with
brownfield redevelopment.

NUMBER OF BROWNFIELD SITES

NUMBER OF KNOWN BROWNFIELD SITES LOCATED
WITHIN RESPONDENTS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE
51 or more

12.90%

21 to 50

16.13%

11 to 20

9.68%

1 to 10

51.61%

None

9.68%
0
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12

NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS

Figure 1. Number of known brownfield sites.
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Figure 2 shows the number of brownfield sites that respondents have identified as
having been redeveloped over the last five years within their sphere of influence. The
reported number of redeveloped sites provides the second half of the information required
to establish a baseline rate of redevelopment. Twelve respondents, representing almost 40
percent of the entire sample, indicated that no redevelopment of brownfield sites has
occurred within their sphere of influence over the last five years. Eleven respondents
indicated that they had redeveloped between one and four brownfield sites and six
respondents indicated that they had redeveloped five or more brownfield sites within the
last five years. The frequency of responses indicating no redevelopment has a strong
correlation to the low number of brownfield sites and demonstrates that the majority of
participating local governments have little to no brownfield redevelopment experience.

NUMBER OF REDEVELOPED BROWNFIELD
SITES

NUMBER OF BROWNFIELD SITES REDEVELOPED WITHIN
RESPONDENT'S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE
5 or more

19.35%

4
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3

6.45%
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Figure 2. Number of redeveloped brownfield sites.
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The rate of redevelopment was calculated for each respondent to find individual
scores. Mid-points of aggregated responses for the number of brownfield sites located
within the respondent’s sphere of influence were used to represent the most accurate
score given the available information. Responses that indicate an open ended value
beyond a given number were entered as the lowest specified value to avoid unsupported
rates of redevelopment. Respondents indicating either zero brownfield sites or zero
redeveloped sites over the last five years were given a rate of redevelopment equal to
zero. Figure 3 the frequency of redevelopment rates for the entire sample.

FREQUENCY OF REDEVELOPMENT RATES
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS

14
12
10
8
6
4
2

60.00%

40.00%

26.67%

20.00%

14.29%

13.33%

11.43%

9.80%

8.57%

5.71%

0.00%

0

RATE OF REDEVELOPMENT

Figure 3. Frequency of redevelopment rates.

The median rate of redevelopment is 9.80% and the mean rate for all respondents
is 11.31% with a variation of 2.07% and a standard deviation of 14.40%. The small
sample size contributes to a low mean rate of redevelopment and a standard deviation that
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cannot be used for statistical analysis. Measures of association are inferred weakly
throughout the findings based on the rates of redevelopment shown above. The calculated
rates demonstrate a wide range of redevelopment implying that participating local
governments have different levels of experience that do not have strong relationships
with each other.
All of the gathered information leading to a baseline rate of redevelopment
indicates that participating local governments have very little to no experience with
brownfield redevelopment. Participating local governments with rates of redevelopment
40 percent or greater can be considered outliers compared to the entire sample. This
information affects how incentives are viewed. It could imply that the incentives offered
to date have been ineffective, or that the more inexperienced participating local
governments are still experimenting with incentive packages that will be more effective
in increasing the future rate of redevelopment. Although strong inferences cannot be
made with this study, relationships between different types of incentives, demographic
variables, contextual variables and the rate of redevelopment show a positive influence in
brownfield redevelopment.
Incentives – Independent Variables
Each of the five different types of incentives investigated in this study represents
an independent variable that may influence the rate of redevelopment. Correlations
between each type of incentive are investigated to see if any patterns emerge showing
preferences of groupings. The incentives are also independently correlated to the rate of
redevelopment to show how each one affects brownfield redevelopment in the
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participating local government’s sphere of influence. Table 1 identifies each of the
incentives that have been investigated.

Table 2
Types of Incentives
Incentive #1

Fast-tracked or streamlined development application process

Incentive #2

Risk based cleanup standards

Incentive #3

Liability relief or indemnification of future site cleanup

Incentive #4

Tax breaks

Incentive #5

Any type of direct funding assistance

Figure 4 shows the frequency of each incentive type being offered by
participating local governments. Range of responses varied between 13 cases for direct
funding assistance, representing approximately 42 percent of respondents, to only two
cases for tax breaks, representing approximately six percent of respondents. Fourteen
respondents, representing approximately 45 percent of all respondents, indicated that they
did not offer any type of incentive. Only two respondents indicated that they offered four
or more incentives together while 15 respondents indicated that they had offered between
one and three incentives. These results show that participating local governments are
more likely to provide direct funding assistance with the redevelopment of brownfield
sites than any other type of incentive. This could be for a variety of reasons including the
level of experience and a desire to retain rights of liability enforcement of the local
government.
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FRERQUENCY OF INCENTIVES OFFERED BY LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS

INCENTIVE TYPES

Direct Funding Assistance
Tax Breaks
Liability Relief
Risk Based Cleanup
Fast-Tracked Project Review
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Figure 4. Frequency of incentives offered by local governments.

Research by Alberini et al. (2005) has shown that private developers will prefer
liability relief over direct funding assistance when they have little to no experience with
brownfield redevelopment and then prefer the direct funding assistance over liability
protection as their experience level increases. It is reasonable to assume an inverse
preference for local governments. Results of this study show that participating local
governments have little to no experience and that direct funding assistance is the most
frequently offered type of incentive. A larger sample size that includes participating local
governments that have more brownfield redevelopment experience may yield an increase
in frequency of risk based cleanup and liability relief being offered as incentives to foster
brownfield redevelopment.
Incentives are typically offered as part of a package to private developers or land
owners that may include several different types. The statistical analysis shows three
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patterns of association that are statistically significant at the .01 and .05 levels. Risk
based cleanups and liability relief are the most common pairs of incentives offered by
participating local governments. From review of the relevant literature, it is known that
risk based cleanup standards are both a form of liability relief, so it is not surprising to
see a strong correlation between the two types of incentives. Results support the belief
that local governments will typically offer these two incentives together as part of an
incentive package to promote the redevelopment of brownfield sites. See appendix E,
table 2 for correlations between the five different types of incentives that are investigated.
The pairing of direct funding assistance to risk based cleanup and to liability relief
are statistically significant at the .01 and .05 levels respectively. Direct funding assistance
is the most frequently offered incentive to private developers or land owners by the
participating local governments, which partially explains correlations between other types
of incentives. Types and amounts of direct funding assistance are at the sole discretion of
the offering local government and are not accounted for in this study. Local governments
have less discretion over risk based cleanup standards and liability relief because these
are directly tied to the framework of the state’s voluntary cleanup program.
Results shown in table 2 imply that direct funding assistance has a strong
influence over other types of incentives that are offered by participating local
governments. Local governments have more control over direct funding assistance and
can utilize their discretion in how funds are allocated. The strong correlations between
direct funding assistance, risk based cleanups and liability relief may demonstrate the
need for financial assistance to be present before risk based cleanup or liability relief is
offered. Research has shown the need for financial incentives to offset the costs
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associated with contaminated lands. Risk based cleanup and liability relief may not be
enough of an incentive to encourage redevelopment of severely contaminated lands.
Each independent type of incentive may be offered as part of a larger incentive
package. The percentage of incentive packages that include each type of incentive was
determined to further investigate any patters of groupings. Figures 5.1 through 5.5 each
show what percentage of respective incentives are included with all incentive packages
offered to private developers or land owners. Aggregated answer choices were provided
to represent zero, 25, 50, 75 and 100 percent increments. Respondents indicating zero
percent may have offered that respective incentive type for an isolated case.

PERCENTAGE OF INCENTIVE PACKAGES
THAT INCLUDE FAST-TRACKED PROJECT
REVIEW

PERCENTAGE OF ALL INCENTIVE PACKAGES THAT INCLUDE
FAST-TRACKED PROJECT REVIEW
100%

2 cases

75%

1 case

50%

2 cases

25%

2 cases

0%

1 case
0

1

2

3

NUMBER OF CASES - 8 RESPONDENTS TOTAL

Figure 5.1. Percentage of all incentive packages that include fast-tracked project review.
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PERCENTAGE OF INCENTIVE PACKAGES
THAT INCLUDE RISK BASED CLEANUP

PERCENTAGE OF ALL INCENTIVE PACKAGES THAT INCLUDE
RISK BASED CLEANUP
100%

2 cases
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1 case

0%
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NUMBER OF CASES - 6 RESPONDENTS TOTAL

Figure 5.2. Percentage of all incentive packages that include risk based cleanup.

PERCENTAGE OF INCENTIVE PACKAGES
THAT INCLUDE LIABILITY RELIEF

PERCENTAGE OF ALL INCENTIVE PACKAGES THAT INCLUDE
LIABILITY RELIEF
100%
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75%
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50%

1 case

25%
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0%
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1 case
0

1
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3

4

NUMBER OF CASES - 8 RESPONDENTS TOTAL

Figure 5.3. Percentage of all incentive packages that include liability relief. In the single
case offering liability relief with 100% of all incentive packages, the respondent stated
that liability protection under the Polanco Act is the key trigger.
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PERCENTAGE OF INCENTIVE PACKAGES
THAT INCLUDE TAX BREAKS

PERCENTAGE OF ALL INCENTIVE PACKAGES THAT INCLUDE
TAX BREAKS
100%
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75%
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1 case

25%
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0%

0 cases
0
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NUMBER OF CASES - 2 RESPONDENTS TOTAL

Figure 5.4. Percentage of all incentive packages that include tax breaks.

PERCENTAGE OF INCENTIVE PACKAGES
THAT INCLUDE DIRECT FUNDING
ASSISTANCE

PERCENTAGE OF ALL INCENTIVE PACKAGES THAT INCLUDE
DIRECT FUNDING ASSISTANCE
100%
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Figure 5.5. Percentage of all incentive packages that include direct funding assistance.
No statistical significance was determined through analysis of percentage of all
incentive packages that included each type of incentive. This demonstrates the fact that
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each brownfield site has unique characteristics and implies that incentive packages are
created independently for each project. Less than half of participating local governments
chose to provide information on the percentage of all incentive packages that include
each type of specific incentive; therefore, it was not optimal to run any type of regression
analysis on how the number or amount of incentives included affected the rate of
redevelopment.
The influence of incentives on redevelopment of brownfield sites was first
analyzed as a total grouping of all incentives and then separately by individual incentive.
A chi squared test was calculated to determine the measure of association between
grouped pairs of incentives/no incentives and redevelopment/no redevelopment. The
table and calculation were set up only to determine an ordinal level of association to
predict the order of pairs of cases between incentives that are offered and redevelopment
that occurs.

Table 3
Chi Square Test for Redevelopment and Incentives
Brownfield Redevelopment
Redeveloped Sites

No Incentives

Incentives

Totals

No Redevelopment

8

4

12

__6__

__13__

__19__

14

17

31

Redevelopment
Totals

The resulting gamma of .625 means that when predicting the order of pairs of
cases on the dependent variable of redevelopment, 62.5% more errors are made by taking
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the set of independent variables of incentives into account. This reflects a very weak
measure of association perhaps due to the small sample size; however, a pattern exists
that could offer different results if the sample size were to increase. The pattern implies a
positive relationship between incentives and the rate of redevelopment.
Appendix E, table 3 shows the statistical correlations between the rate of
redevelopment and each type of incentive. Correlations between the rate of
redevelopment and each type of incentive are very weak, and in three cases, show a
negative relationship. Direct funding assistance has the closest correlation to rate of
redevelopment but is not statistically significant at the .10 level. Small sample size may
be the primary influence in this statistical outcome, but there may be other generalized
inferences that can be drawn.
The results of the survey generally show that incentive packages offered by
participating local governments to private developers or land owners for the
redevelopment of brownfield sites only marginally influences the rate of redevelopment.
This may imply that state or federal involvement matters more to the private developer or
land owner when choosing to invest in brownfield redevelopment. Federal and State
governments may be more suited to providing incentives that influence the rate of
brownfield redevelopment. Risk based cleanup standards and liability relief are directly
connected to the state’s voluntary cleanup program so it is not surprising that
participating local governments have not offered these types of incentives as often as
direct funding assistance. Local governments may generally feel more comfortable with
offering direct funding assistance because any loss would be limited to financial terms.
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It is interesting that more participating local governments do not offer fast-tracked
project review; however, this may be directly related to issues of liability relief.
Hesitation to offer fast-tracked project review more often may be based either in a local
governments desire to maintain as much control as possible over the redevelopment of
brownfield sites or their lack of experience and a desire to thoroughly review all
applications pertaining to brownfield redevelopment. That said, there is a statistically
significant relationship at the .10 level between participating local governments that have
stricter cleanup standards than those of the Federal or State government and fast-tracked
project review. This suggests that there may be other variables influencing how incentive
packages are created or even the rate of redevelopment itself.
Demographics – Contextual Variables
Demographic variables of a local government may influence how incentives are
used to foster brownfield redevelopment. The demographics of a local government may
also directly affect the rate of redevelopment. Geographic location of each participating
local government was identified and investigated for any potential relationships in
addition to demographic variables of population, median house value, and available sales
and use tax.
There are no formal or politically recognized boundaries in the State of California
between north, south, central coast, or central valley areas. These boundaries are social
boundaries only and their placement or limits are debated. Appendix C shows the
location of all participating local governments and set boundaries between the four
demographic areas. Figure 6 shows a percentage breakdown of participating local
governments by demographic area. The majority of respondents came from Northern
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California, but Southern California and the Central Valley have strong representation at
an equal rate. The breakdown of geographic location does not yield any statistically
significant relationships to the rate of redevelopment.

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF PARTICIPATING LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
25.81%
Central Valley
38.71%
Northern California

9.68%
Central Coast

25.81%
Southern California

Figure 6. Location of participating local governments.

Population, households, median household income, and median house value are
all indicators of potential resources available to a local government when creating
incentive packages for brownfield redevelopment. Larger populations typically require a
larger government structure and, in terms of available resources, should be better suited
to deal with complex issues such as brownfield redevelopment. A higher median
household income and median house value are indicators of a larger tax base to draw
from when creating incentive packages. Geographic locations of participating local
governments may also show a trend of redevelopment specific to certain areas.
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The United States Census Bureau classifies the divide between urban and rural
populations as 50,000. Twenty respondents, approximately 65 percent, have a population
of 50,000 or less with the remaining 11 respondents having a population of greater than
50,000, which skews the results into showing a stronger bias towards rural populations.
However, some of the participating local governments with rural populations are located
inside of larger metropolitan areas but have a limited sphere of influence confined to their
political boundaries.
The range of population of the respondents was from 3,621 to 243,771. The total
population of all responding local governments is 1,751,784, which represents a little
more than five percent of California’s 33,871,648 residents but the median population of
participating local governments is 42,236 compared to the median population of 28,862
for all California cities. This implies that while the sample size may be weak, the
participating local governments represent a population that greater than most California
cities. The range of median house values of the respondents was from $86,700 to
$479,800, with a median value of $169,400. The median house value in the State of
California is $211,500, which shows that participating local governments are below
median value. Similar to population, the median house value of a local government is one
indicator of potential resources available that could influence incentive packages for the
redevelopment of brownfield sites. Sales and use tax figures for the participating local
governments were researched to provide additional context of the sample size and its
demographic representation. Participating local governments account for five and a
quarter percent of all available sales and use tax for 2006 through 2007 according to the
California State Board of Equalization.
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Table 4 in appendix E shows the correlations between each type of incentive and
the different demographic variables noted. The only statistically significant positive
relationship found was between risk based cleanup and a participating local government’s
population, implying that local governments with larger populations are more likely to
offer this type of incentive. A strong relationship between liability relief and population
was not found, which is contrary to the relationship found between the two types of
incentives earlier. Negative relationships were consistently found between fast-tracked
project review and tax breaks and all demographic variables. This negative relationship
may reflect the level of experience for participating local governments in addition to the
small sample size.
Table 5 in appendix E shows correlations between the rate of redevelopment and
the different demographic variables noted. The number of households and median income
were added to investigate the potential of any other measure of association. No statistical
significance was found between the rate of redevelopment and any of the census
information gathered.
Other Contextual Variables
There are several other factors that may contribute to the creation of incentive
packages affecting the rate of brownfield redevelopment. Some of these factors may
directly influence the rate of redevelopment itself. This research effort focused on the
following additional factors:
•

Any existing framework based on characteristics of a brownfield site that may
dictate the type and/or amount of incentive offered.
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•

Any funding assistance from the State of California applied to the redevelopment
of a brownfield site.

•

Any funding assistance from the Federal Government applied to the
redevelopment of a brownfield site.

•

Local government taking the initiative to approach private developers or land
owners with an offer of incentives for the redevelopment of a brownfield site.

•

Private developers or land owners approaching local government seeking
incentives for the redevelopment of a brownfield site.

•

Local government having any environmental policies requiring stricter cleanup
standards than state or federal requirements.
Each of these factors was correlated to the five different types of incentives to

investigate if there were any trends. There are several statistically significant correlations
that appear when looking at these other factors; however, there are also correlations that
indicate a negative relationship. Small sample size may be a primary influence in these
relationships, but there are a few noted trends that may have larger implications. Table 6
in Appendix E shows the correlations between each of these contextual variables and the
five different types of incentives.
The statistically significant relationship, at the .10 level, between stricter cleanup
standards and fast-tracked project review is the only other factor that appears to have a
positive influence when looking at this incentive type. However, only one respondent
indicated that their local government has any form of environmental policy or cleanup
standards that are stricter than those of the state or federal government, which renders this
relationship statistically insignificant. A weak positive connection exists between fast-
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track project review and when a participating local government approaches a developer,
but this is also reasonable. If a local government is approaching a private developer or
land owner to initiate redevelopment of a brownfield site, then offering a streamline
project approval process would be an easy accommodation. The local government is
acting as the primary stakeholder and it is in their best interest to process the
development application in an expedited manner. It is interesting to note the appearance
of a negative correlation between state funding and the offering of fast-track project
review. It may be the case that a participating local government feels more secure with
the backing of state funding and is no longer acting as the primary stakeholder; thereby
not demonstrating the need to expedite any project approval.
Correlating each of the contextual variables to risk based cleanup standards has
produced interesting results with an equal number of negative and positive relationships.
The presence of federal funding and initiation of development by either local government
or private parties all show a statistically significant positive relationship to risk based
cleanup standards. This connection reflects a comfort level that local governments have
in offering any type of incentives with liability relief when federal assistance is present.
Existing frameworks for incentives, the presence of state funding, and stricter cleanup
standards all yield a negative relationship to risk based cleanups with participating local
governments. Generalized inferences can be drawn on the positive correlation between
stricter cleanup standards and risk based cleanup, but the lack of consistency and the
negative relationships seen with other contextual variables makes this very difficult. This
lack of consistency is most likely contributed to the small sample size.
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Liability relief has similar inconsistencies as risk based cleanup standards but
there are two positive relationships worth noting. Participating local governments that
approach a private developer or land owner for redevelopment of brownfield sites yields
a very strong correlation to liability relief. This supports Alberini’s research (2005)
results showing private parties with less brownfield redevelopment experience preferring
liability relief over any type of funding assistance. There is also a strong correlation at the
.10 level between this incentive type and when private parties approach the participating
local governments for redevelopment of brownfield sites. In addition, there is a strong
correlation between liability relief and the presence of federal funding suggesting that the
financial security provided by the federal government may promote participating local
governments to offer this type of incentive.
No statistically significant relationships exist between the other contextual
variables and tax breaks offered by participating local governments. No relationship,
positive or negative, would be statistically significant given only two respondents
indicating this type of incentive. Tax structure is closely related to state and federal
systems and it would be difficult for a local government to provide additional tax breaks
given this constraint.
Direct funding assistance is the most common incentive offered by participating
local governments to private developers or land owners. It does not come as a surprise
that the presence of state and federal funding have a strong correlation to the offering of
this incentive. Research has shown that the redevelopment of brownfield sites can be very
complex and requires a substantial amount of funding incentives in order to offset many
of the negative conditions associated with most brownfield sites. Direct funding
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assistance was offered by nearly 50 percent of participating local governments and in
most cases, state and federal money has been dedicated to the redevelopment of all
brownfield sites. The other strong correlation to direct funding assistance is when the
participating local government approaches the private developer or land owner. This may
be attributed directly to the interest of the participating local government as a primary
stakeholder and their desire to see a specific brownfield site redeveloped. It is interesting
to note the negative relationship between direct funding assistance and any existing
framework within participating local governments for the creation of incentives. This
may be a result of inexperience with participating local governments who have not
previously offered any type of incentive to private developers or land owners.
Each of these factors may influence the rate of redevelopment independently.
Table 7 in Appendix E shows the correlations between each of these contextual variables
and the rate of redevelopment. Several correlations that are statistically significant
between the .05 and .10 level are found when looking at this data, matching the results of
previously presented data. There is a strong relationship between the presence of an
existing framework for incentives and the rate of redevelopment. This is supported by a
strong relationship between when a participating local government approaches a private
developer or land owner to initiate the redevelopment of a brownfield site. It is likely that
participating local governments having an existing framework for the creation of
incentives are more likely to be proactive acting as primary stakeholders in fostering the
redevelopment of brownfield sites.
There is also a strong correlation between the presence of state and federal
funding assistance. It makes sense that any local government pursuing state or federal
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assistance would indeed pursue both. The data also shows that private developers or land
owners are more likely to engage the participating local governments when federal
assistance is available. Another interesting correlation exists between participating local
governments approaching the private developer or land owner and the other way around.
This suggests a relationship built between the two entities for the sake of pursing a
common interest. A presupposition of any development by private entities is the increase
of profits, which in turn, benefits the local government. This data supports the notion, on
a general level, that participating local governments work in conjunction with private
developers or land owners to foster the redevelopment of brownfield sites.

RESPONSE TO STATE AND/OR FEDERAL
CONTRIBUTIONS

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MORE OR LESS LIKELY TO
OFFER INCENTIVE PACKAGES WITH THE PRESENCE OF
STATE OR FEDERAL ASSISTENCE
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38.71%

Will Only Offer Incentives if State or
Federal Government Contribute
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Figure 7. Local governments more or less likely to offer incentive with state or federal
assistance.

62

Participating local governments had the opportunity to provide feedback on
contextual variables that could influence the creation of incentive packages. One of the
primary influences in the creation of any incentive package is the presence of state or
federal assistance. Respondents were asked if they were more or less likely to offer
incentive packages to private developers or land owners if the State of California or the
Federal Government had already contributed to the redevelopment of a brownfield site.
Figure 7 shows how participating local governments are likely to offer incentive
packages based on the presence of state or federal assistance.
It is not surprising that the majority of participating local governments state that
they are more likely to offer incentive packages if there is additional assistance from the
state or federal government or that they are less likely to do so without it. What is
interesting is the 12 respondents, representing a little less than 40 percent of all
participating local governments, indicating that it makes no difference if state or federal
assistance is present. This may be due to the small sample size or it may reflect a
proactive approach by the participating local governments. There is a strong correlation
between the local government who approached the private developer or land owner to
initiate the redevelopment of brownfield sites (see table 6 below). This suggests that
participating local governments acting as the primary stakeholder are interested in the
redevelopment of brownfield sites regardless of any state of federal involvement; which
also supports the strong presence of incentive type five, direct funding assistance from
the local government. Only one respondent indicated that the private developer or land
owner backed away from redevelopment after they had assessed the risk when the
participating local government had approached them and offered financial assistance.
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Most participating local governments stated individual management of brownfield
redevelopment sites on a case by case basis when asked if there was any framework for
the creation of incentive packages based on site characteristics. One of the respondents
indicated that there was an EPA Brownfields Revolving Loan Fund grant in place
allowing different incentives for site contaminated with petroleum versus other materials.
Two respondents indicated that the offering of incentives was tied to limits of tax
increment and sales tax financing available through the redevelopment of the site. Two
respondents indicated that the level of need for the project was a deciding factor and one
respondent indicated that the location of the brownfield site was important because of
public involvement. All of these responses are isolated but still provide insight to the
thought process of participating local governments when creating a framework for
incentive packages. The fundamental factor is that each brownfield site is treated
differently for reasons ranging from level of contamination to its location.
Liability relief in the State of California is closely tied to the Polanco
Redevelopment Act of 1990. The Polanco Act provides a framework of process for
redevelopment agencies in the state to follow when cleaning up contaminated lands. This
Act provides redevelopment agencies power to enforce prescribed cleanup plans and
grants the ability to perform the work itself or outsouce the cleanup is the responsible
party does not comply. The Polanco Act has become a powerful tool for redevelopment
agencies throughout the state to foster the cleanup of contaminated lands. Incentive type
three, liability relief, can be directly tied to the Polanco Act if the participating local
government has enacted this legislation. One respondent indicated that the Polanco Act
was invoked after a private developer or land owner insisted that the participating local
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government offer incentives for the redevelopment of a brownfield site. This
demonstrates a local governments due diligence in pursing brownfield redevelopment
while retaining their right to enforce liability as needed.
Other Observations
Each respondent was given the opportunity to provide open ended feedback on his
or her experiences of brownfield redevelopment. Several comments echo literature and
research surrounding all topics of redevelopment. There were other comments made that
are interesting and can apply to any brownfield redevelopment site regardless of location.
One respondent pointed out that corporate priorities and market conditions are a greater
influence on the redevelopment of brownfield sites than any action taken by a local
government. This sentiment was supported by another respondent’s comment that the
perceived value of brownfield sites has been growing with private developers and land
owner’s sophistication and that public agencies should be careful not to over incentivize
any brownfield site. Economic factors are a primary concern for all parties involved with
redevelopment projects and a noted concern by several respondents is that the cost of
remediation is prohibitive for most contaminated sites. Federal, state, and local incentives
are required in many cases to offset the cost of remediation associated with contaminated
sites. One of the side effects of state or federal assistance in some cases is the
requirement of prevailing wages, which tends to increase construction costs by
approximately 20 to 30 percent.
All of these factors are easier to deal with when they are known as opposed to
coming up as a surprise once action has been taken towards redevelopment. One
respondent noted that private developers would rather deal with higher known costs than
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any surprises. Other respondents indicated that education of the public and the city
council are equally important so that additional roadblocks can be avoided and money
can be saved. Starting with a vision of end use and working backwards to identify all the
necessary steps of redevelopment is a noted piece of advice from one respondent.
Unknown costs that are unexpected can be a greater deterrent for brownfield
redevelopment than liability. Another respondent noted that private developers will shy
away from brownfield redevelopment projects if funding is not identified and indemnity
offered as incentives. This supports the need of local governments to have a clear and
feasible process in place when approaching brownfield redevelopment.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Results from this study show several correlations between the five different types
of incentives that were investigated and the rate of brownfield redevelopment. The small
sample size of 31 participating local governments does not provide a strong base from
which statewide inferences can be made; however, recognizable patterns have emerged
that are interesting to observe and important to note. Each of these noted patterns may
have significant implications for brownfield redevelopment within the State of California
and possibly throughout the nation. The most notable pattern recognized from the sample
was the level of experience from participating local governments. This relative level of
inexperience, combined with the small sample size suggests that future research of how
incentive packages offered by local governments to private developers or land owners for
the redevelopment of brownfield sites should be pursued.
Over half of the participating local governments were able to identify 10 or fewer
brownfield sites within their sphere of influence. Exact numbers and locations of all
brownfield sites within the State of California are not known, but with an estimated
90,000 sites in the state, it is likely that local governments having at least one brownfield
site may have several more that they are unaware of. It is possible that individual
respondents may be conflating brownfield sites with Superfund sites, which is only a
small portion of all brownfield sites throughout the nation. The U.S. EPA has defined
brownfields as sites having contaminants as well as sites that are simply perceived to
have contaminants (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). The inclusion of
perception is important because it expands the definition of brownfields to include sites
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that have not been formally assessed for contamination. It is likely that there are more
brownfield sites located within the participating local government’s sphere of influence
than actually known or documented. Estimates ranging from 500,000 to 1,000,000
brownfield sites across the nation (Simons, 1999, Wedding & Crawford-Brown, 2007)
support the notion of there being more contaminated lands than most local governments
are aware of.
Many brownfield sites remain dormant without any attention until the land owner
has made the decision to either sell or redevelop. Some local governments are proactive
in approaching private developers or land owners to initiate the redevelopment of these
underutilized lands and results from this study show that they will typically have a higher
rate of redevelopment. A higher rate of redevelopment will yield more tax revenue for the
local government in addition to environmental justice for the contaminated land and in
many cases, a social justice for the underutilized property. Local governments that
approach private developers or land owners for the redevelopment of brownfield sites
typically offer some form of incentive to offset the challenges associated with
contaminated lands (Alberini et al., 2005, Swartz & Vieweg, 2000). This research has
investigated how those incentive packages, along with other contextual variables,
influences the rate of brownfield redevelopment.
The median rate of redevelopment for the participating local governments in this
research effort was 9.80%, which is lower than expected when reviewing available
literature that supports a growing trend of brownfield redevelopment. The median rate
implies that the process of brownfield redevelopment is relatively new for the
participating local governments and that more experienced local governments should be
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included with future research to report more accurate results. Thirty-eight percent of the
participating local governments had a rate of redevelopment equal to zero, and in three of
these cases, there were no identified brownfield sites at all. This condition contributes to
the weakness in findings from this research effort, but it also suggests that local
governments are interested in learning how to increase their rate of brownfield
redevelopment.
Demographic variables may contribute to the rate of brownfield redevelopment
within a local government’s sphere of influence. Local governments with populations of
less than 50,000 do not have the same level of resources available as urban local
governments with lager populations. Resources include available tax revenue and staff
members that can dedicate time to the complex brownfield redevelopment process.
Results from this study indicate that rural local governments may have a strong vested
interest in redevelopment of brownfield sites located within their sphere of influence.
This could be for several reasons including, but not limited to, high needs for tax revenue
from underutilized lands, strong community input, or less available land area, resulting in
a greater need for infill redevelopment.
Each brownfield site has unique set of characteristics and opportunities for
redevelopment. Development potential for each brownfield site is independent and may
be one of the greatest contributing influences in the decision to invest by private
developers or land owners. It is reasonable to assume that not all brownfield sites are
prime redevelopment opportunities, which explains, in part, the low number of
brownfield sites that were reported by participating local governments.
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Incentives
Incentives are a key element of the brownfield redevelopment process. Research
has shown that private developers and land owners require incentives to offset
remediation costs associated with contaminated lands (Alberini et al., 2005, DeSousa,
2005). This research effort has focused on five common types of incentives offered by
local governments to promote the redevelopment of brownfields and how those
incentives influence the rate of redevelopment. Results from this study do not show any
statistically significant correlations between the different types of incentives and the rate
of redevelopment; however, these results may be misleading because of the small sample
size. The total number of respondents with any rate of redevelopment above zero offered
almost twice as many incentives as those respondents who did not have any
redevelopment within their sphere of influence. This broadly shows a positive
relationship between incentives and the occurrence of brownfield redevelopment and
could be statistically significant if the sample size was increased. Local governments
considering an offer of incentives to private developers or land owners for the
redevelopment of brownfield sites should expect to see a positive return on their own
investment.
Incentives are often offered as part of a package that may include more than just
one type. This focus of this study has not been the grouping of different incentive types
or the influence that each type has on the other; however, results have some patterns
worth noting. Over half of the respondents indicated that they would be more likely to
offer incentives to private developers or land owners if there is a presence of state or
federal government assistance. Less than half of the respondents had even pursued state
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or federal government assistance, which can explain the weak correlation between
incentive packages and rate of redevelopment found in this study. Results of this study
support the idea that local governments are less likely to become involved with
brownfield redevelopment unless there is some form of state or federal assistance to
supplement their efforts.
The most common type of incentive offered by participating local governments in
this study was direct funding assistance. Preference in offering direct funding assistance
shows a bias towards economic priorities or goals that local governments may wish to
achieve through brownfield redevelopment. Several of the respondents commented on
how the redevelopment of brownfield sites within their sphere of influence was directly
linked to tax increment financing from that project. This demonstrates an economic
expectation that participating local governments have when offering direct funding
assistance. The cost of offering direct funding assistance is outweighed by the potential
benefit recognized through a redeveloped brownfield site. There is no guarantee of
financial gain from any development project, but local governments should give strong
consideration to offering direct funding assistance with an expectation of benefits.
There is insufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis that different types of
incentives positively affect the rate of redevelopment. Despite statistical correlations that
show no significant relationships, the small sample size and other noted trends indicate
that local governments offering incentives to private developers or land owners for the
redevelopment of brownfield sites within their sphere of influence will see a higher rate
of redevelopment. Data that was gathered shows that local governments are willing to
offer incentive packages even when the resulting rate of redevelopment is zero. This
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demonstrates a high level of interest by local governments in redevelopment of
underutilized lands that could bring economic, environmental, and social benefits to all
stakeholders. The relative inexperience of participating local governments in this study
may also suggest that more experience will lead to refinement of incentive packages that
are more effective in increasing the rate of redevelopment. Contextual variables that may
differ between local governments can also have a significant effect on the rate of
redevelopment.
Future Research
Future research of brownfield redevelopment should continue to focus on how
incentives influence the rate of redevelopment. A longitudinal study to investigate
changes in rate of redevelopment influenced by incentives may be possible if the same
respondents are willing to participate in the future. Other types of incentives may be
included with future investigation in addition to patterns of incentive packages that local
governments offer to private developers or land owners. Specific attention should be
directed to correlations between incentives that are offered and the rate of redevelopment
for the participating local government.
Researchers interested in furthering this study should attempt to increase the
sample size from the State of California or concentrate on a targeted geographic area.
Local governments could be expanded to include county and other municipal agencies
that may have experience with brownfield redevelopment. This research effort may also
be duplicated in a similar manner to geographic areas outside the State of California.
Inferences from this study are useful to any level of local government interested or
experienced with brownfield redevelopment. Aggregated response choices should be
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grouped by smaller and more consistent increments to avoid duplicate rankings with a
larger sample size. Case studies showing the effectiveness of incentives on the rate of
brownfield redevelopment should be developed and included in any future research.
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Appendix A: Survey

SURVEY BRAINSTORM
¾ Name of municipal agency (and department housed in – might make a difference if you are in an
environment/health versus economic development)
¾ Solely responsible for brownfield redevelopment issues within municipal/geographical area (if
not, can you provide the name of the other individuals responsible and describe what they are
responsible for)
¾ Average fiscal year operating budget over last five years
¾ Are you aware of state and federal assistance programs for the redevelopment of brownfields
(separate state and federal)
¾ Estimated brownfield sites within sphere of influence (site # or/and acreage)
¾ How many brownfield sites have been redeveloped over the last five years (how many sites have
received certification of completion? How many sites have been redeveloped?)
¾ Level of community involvement with in the redevelopment of brownfield sites (by
redevelopment type?)
¾ Required disclosure to the public of any incentives that are offered to private companies
¾ When did your agency start offering incentives to private developers for the redevelopment of
brownfield sites? / When was the first incentive offered?
¾ Does your agency believe that offering incentives is beneficial to the community?
¾ Have you increased or decreased the amount of incentives offered over the last five years? (or
changed the relative percentage of type?)
¾ Have private developers or land owners specifically asked for incentives or stated that they will
not redevelop without an incentive?
¾ Have you offered any unsolicited incentives to land owners of brownfield sites? / Have they been
redeveloped as a result?
¾ Does your municipality have any environmental polices different that those of the state or federal
government that require the cleanup of brownfield sites?
Incentives
 Have you offered any incentives with the brownfield sites that have been redeveloped within the
last five years
 Have you offered streamlined plan review process as an incentive
 Have you offered risk based cleanup standards as an incentive
 Have you offered any relief or indemnification of future site cleanup as an incentive
 Have you offered any tax breaks to property owners or development companies as an incentive
 Have you offered any direct funding assistance towards remediation or any other part of
development as an incentive. Money may be from any funding source.
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BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT SURVEY
DEMOGRAPHICS & BASELINE BROWNFIELD INFORMATION
1)

Name of the city/county/other participating in the survey.
__________________________________________________________________

2)

Department within municipality that is responsible for completing this survey.
__________________________________________________________________

3)

Contact information of person responsible for completing this survey.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________

4)

Is your department solely responsible for the redevelopment of brownfield sites and
related issues within your municipal/geographic area?
Yes

No
a. If not, will you please provide contact information for other individuals or
departments who may be responsible for issues relating to the redevelopment of
brownfields?
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
__________________________
b. Does your department typically take the lead role in the redevelopment of
brownfields?
Yes

No

c. What other departments have participated with issues relating to the
redevelopment of brownfield sites within your municipal or geographic areas?
Planning
Economic Development
Housing
Other (Please describe)

5)

Please indicate your departments’ average fiscal year operating budget over the last five
years.
________________________________________________________________________
____________
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6)

To the best of your knowledge, how many brownfield sites exist within your
muni1cipality’s sphere of influence.
0
1 - 10
11 - 20
21 - 50
51 or more

7)

To the best of your knowledge, how much acreage within your sphere of influence would
be considered a brownfield site?
________________________________________________________________________
____________

8)

How many brownfield sites have been redeveloped within your sphere of influence over
the last five years?
0
1
2
3
4
5 or more

a. How many redeveloped brownfield sites have received a certification of
completion over the last five years?
0
1
2
3
4
5 or more

INCENTIVE PACKAGES
The following questions are targeting incentives that are offered by your municipality to private
developers and/or land owners for the purposes of brownfield site redevelopment. The only
incentives pertaining to this section of the survey are those that your municipality offers
above and beyond those of the state or federal government.
9)

Of the brownfield sites that have been redeveloped over the last five years within your
sphere of influence (identified in question #8a above), how many have had locally
provided incentive packages as part of the redevelopment process?
All
None
Other Amount (please specify)
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10)

Is your municipality more or less likely to offer additional incentive packages to private
developers and/or land owners for the redevelopment of brownfield sites if the State of
California or the Federal government has contributed incentives
Will only offer incentive packages if State or Federal incentives are offered
More Likely
Less Likely
Makes no difference
Other (please explain)

11)

Has your municipality increased or decreased the amount of incentive packages offered
to private developers or land owners over the last five years?
Increased

Decreased

a. Why?
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
12)

Has your municipality offered any type of fast-tracked or streamlined application review
process as an incentive?
Yes

No
a. Is this type of incentive used as the primary incentive in packages that are offered
with the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

b. Is this type of incentive your municipality’s preference over other incentives
offered with the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

c. Is this offered as a part of every incentive package tied to the redevelopment of
brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

d. What percentage of incentive packages that are offered to private developers or
land owners include this type of incentive?
25%
50%
75%
100%
Other Percentage (please provide) ___________________
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13)

Has your municipality offered any type of risk based cleanup standards as an incentive?
Yes

No
a. Is this type of incentive used as the primary incentive in packages that are offered
with the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

b. Is this type of incentive your municipality’s preference over other incentives
offered with the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

c. Is this offered as a part of every incentive package tied to the redevelopment of
brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

d. What percentage of incentive packages that are offered to private developers or
land owners include this type of incentive?
25%
50%
75%
100%
Other Percentage (please provide) ___________________
14)

Has your municipality offered any type of relief or indemnification of future site cleanup
as an incentive?
Yes

No
a. Is this type of incentive used as the primary incentive in packages that are offered
with the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

b. Is this type of incentive your municipality’s preference over other incentives
offered with the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

c. Is this offered as a part of every incentive package tied to the redevelopment of
brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A
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d. What percentage of incentive packages that are offered to private developers or
land owners include this type of incentive?
25%
50%
75%
100%
Other Percentage (please provide) ___________________
15)

Has your municipality offered any type of tax breaks to private developers or land owners
as an incentive?
Yes

No
a. Is this type of incentive used as the primary incentive in packages that are offered
with the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

b. Is this type of incentive your municipality’s preference over other incentives
offered with the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

c. Is this offered as a part of every incentive package tied to the redevelopment of
brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

d. What percentage of incentive packages that are offered to private developers or
land owners include this type of incentive?
25%
50%
75%
100%
Other Percentage (please provide) ___________________
16)

Has your municipality offered any type of direct funding assistance towards remediation
or any other part of development as an incentive? (Money may come from any funding
source.)
Yes

No
a. Is this type of incentive used as the primary incentive in packages that are offered
with the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A
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b. Is this type of incentive your municipality’s preference over other incentives
offered with the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

c. Is this offered as a part of every incentive package tied to the redevelopment of
brownfield sites?
Yes

No

N/A

d. What percentage of incentive packages that are offered to private developers or
land owners include this type of incentive?
25%
50%
75%
100%
Other Percentage (please provide) ___________________
17)

Please describe how your municipality decides on what types of incentive packages or
the amount of incentives that are offered to private developers or land owners for the
redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Discretionary action by municipality
Direct community input
Feedback from private developer or land owner
Other (please describe)
Please use the space below to outline and/or describe the decision making process:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________

18)

Do the incentive packages that are offered to private developers or land owners change
from site to site?
Yes

No
a. Is there any framework within your municipality that dictates the type and/or
amount of incentive offered in relation to characteristics of the brownfield site?
Yes

No

Please describe:
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
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PARTICIPATION IN BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT
19)

Are you aware of brownfield redevelopment assistance programs that are available from
the State of California?
Yes

No
a. Has your municipality applied for or received any assistance money from the
State of California to redevelop any brownfield site within your geographic area?
Yes

No

b. What approximate percentage of brownfield sites has your municipality received
funding for from the State of California?
Less than 25%
25%
50%
75%
100%
c. If any state monies have been received and applied to the redevelopment of
brownfield sites, what is the approximate percentage of total project costs
received per site?
Less than 5%
5% to 10%
11% to 25%
26% or more
20)

Are you aware of brownfield redevelopment assistance programs that are available from
the federal government?
Yes

No
a. Has your municipality applied for or received any assistance money from the
federal government to redevelop any brownfield site within your geographic
area?
Yes

No

b. What approximate percentage of brownfield sites has your municipality received
funding for from the federal government?
Less than 25%
25%
50%
75%
100%
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c. If any federal monies have been received and applied to the redevelopment of
brownfield sites, what is the approximate percentage of total project costs
received per site?
Less than 5%
5% to 10%
11% to 25%
26% or more
21)

Has your municipality ever taken the initiative to offer any type of unsolicited incentive
to a private developer or land owner to foster the redevelopment of a brownfield site
within your sphere of influence?
Yes

No
a. When was the first incentive offered to a private developer or land owner for the
redevelopment of a brownfield site? (approximate month and year)
_________________________________________________________________
_____________

22)

To the best of your knowledge, how many private development companies within your
sphere of influence have worked with the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
None
1–5
6 – 10
11 – 20
21 or more

23)

Has any private developer or land owner approached your municipality seeking an
incentive package for the redevelopment of a brownfield site?
Yes

No
a. As a result, were any incentives offered to the private developer or land owner
for the redevelopment of a brownfield site?
Yes

No
i. Please describe any related circumstances
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
____________________________

b. Have any private developers or land owners insisted that your municipality offer
them an incentive package for the redevelopment of a brownfield site and/or
stated that they would not develop without one?
Yes

No
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i. Please describe any related circumstances
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
____________________________
24)

Has your municipality approached any private developers or land owner with an
unsolicited offer of incentives to redevelop a brownfield site?
Yes

No
a. If so, has the private developer or land owner engaged in the redevelopment of
that brownfield site due to the incentive package that was offered?
Yes

25)

No

Does your municipality believe that there are community benefits from the offering of
incentive packages to private developers or land owners for the redevelopment of
brownfield sites?
Not at all
Rarely, only in special circumstances
Sometimes
All the time
Case by case basis
Please describe two (2) potential benefits that your municipality would consider desirable
to the community.
1) ____________________________________________________________________
2) ____________________________________________________________________

26)

Is there any level of public disclosure that is required for incentive packages that are
offered to private developers or land owners for the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

If yes, please describe:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
27)

Does your municipality seek community participation with the redevelopment of
brownfield sites?
Yes

No
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a. If so, what level of community participation is required?
Public notices
Public hearings
Required public input
Other (please describe)
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
__________________________
b. If so, what level of community participation is preferred?
Public notices
Public hearings
Required public input
Other (please describe)
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
__________________________
c. Does the type of redevelopment dictate the level of community participation?
Yes

No

If yes, how so:
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________
28)

Does your municipality have any environmental policies different to those of the state or
federal government that requires the cleanup of brownfield sites?
Yes

No

Please describe:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
29)

Please describe any best practices that your municipality has incorporated into handling
issues related to the redevelopment of brownfield sites?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
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30)

Please provide one or two examples of lessons learned from a past project where a
brownfield site was (or was not) redeveloped based on an incentive package offered to
the private developer or land owner.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

31)

Would you be willing to participate in an interview regarding the redevelopment of
brownfield sites within your sphere of influence?
Yes

No
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Appendix B: Invitation to Participants

INVITATION TO PARTICIPANTS
To All Local Governments in California,
I am a graduate student in City and Regional Planning at California Polytechnic State University
in San Luis Obispo working on a master’s thesis in brownfield redevelopment. The following
survey has been created to aid in my research of incentive packages influencing the
redevelopment of brownfield sites. Your participation will contribute to an increased
understanding of factors that influence brownfield redevelopment throughout the State of
California. Findings and implications from this research effort will be available for your use by
the third quarter of 2009.
It is important that your local government entity contributes to this research effort regardless of
your redevelopment experience with brownfields. A greater range of responses will provide more
detailed and accurate information. All participating local governments will potentially benefit
from statewide research that may aid in future brownfield redevelopment projects. The survey
should take approximately 30 minutes to complete. Please follow the link below to participate in
this survey on line. Survey responses need to be collected by April 3, 2009.
If you have any questions or further comments, please feel free to contact me. Thank you for your
time and participation.
Erik Simon
ebsimon@calpoly.edu
If you are not the person who is or would be responsible for decisions surrounding incentives for
brownfield redevelopment, please forward this request to the appropriate person if possible.
Thank you.
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Appendix C: Map of California Participants
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Appendix D: Database

What other departments within your municipality or geographic area have participated with
issues directly related to the redevelopment of brownfield sites? (check all that apply)

To the best of your
knowledge, how many
brownfield sites exist
within your
municipality's sphere
of influence?

Local Government

Planning

Economic
Development

Housing

Other (please
describe)

1

City of Tulare

Planning

Economic
Development

Housing

Fire Department

11 to 20

2

City of Santa Barbara

Planning

3

City of Redding

Resource Management
Department,

11 to 20

4

City of Sanger

redevelopment

1 to 10

5

City of San Luis Obispo

Planning

6

City of National City

Planning

7

City of Pittsburg

8

City of Lemoore

9

City of Delano

10

City of Rohnert Park

-6700

11

City of Santa Cruz

Planning

12

City of Poway

Planning

13

City of Livermore

Planning

14

Chula Vista/San Diego

Planning

15

City of Gardena

Planning

16

Town of Paradise

Planning

17

Economic
Development
Economic
Development

1 to 10
Engineering
Planning assisted the
Agency with a few

Economic
Development
Economic
Development

Housing
Housing

Economic
Development
Economic
Development
Economic
Development
Economic
Development
Economic
Development
Economic
Development

Housing

City of Pleasant Hill

19

City of Albany

20

City of Hanford

11 to 20

1 to 10
None
21 to 50
21 to 50

development
department consists of

21 to 50

Housing

51 or more

Housing

51 or more

Housing

1 to 10
dev't are in the same
dept. We take the lead

Planning

21 to 50

1 to 10
City Engineer Public
Works Director
brownfields within our
jurisdiction.
Environmental Health
Department

Housing

City of Emeryville

18

21

1 to 10

Economic
Development

Public Works

51 or more
1 to 10
1 to 10

Planning

City of Huntington Beach

22

City of Stockton

23

City of Santa Fe Springs Planning

24

City of Novato

Planning

25

Culver City

26

City of Ojai

Planning

27

City of Selma

Planning

28

Thousand Oaks

Planning

29

City of Dinuba

Planning

30

City of Mt. Shasta

Planning

31

City of Eureka

Planning

public works
Economic
Development
Economic
Development

1 to 10
1 to 10

Housing
Housing

Economic
Development
Economic
Development

infrastructure and
stormwater issues.
CUPA
would participate,
however, we don't

21 to 50
51 or more
None
1 to 10

City Engineer

1 to 10
None

Housing

Department as a
condition of
Works and
Development Services)

1 to 10
1 to 10
1 to 10

Economic Development
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1 to 10

Of the brownfield sites
Is your municipality
that have been
more or less likely to
redeveloped over the
offer additional
last five years within
incentive packages to
your sphere of
private developers
influence (identified in
and/or land owners for
question #10 from
the redevelopment of
previous page), how
brownfield sites if the
many had locally
State of California of
provided incentive
the Federal
packages as part of the
Government has
redevelopment
Other Amount (please
contributed
process?
specify)
incentives?

Local Government

To the best of your
To the best of your
knowledge, how much knowledge, how many
acreage within your
brownfield sites have
municipality's sphere
been redeveloped
of influence would be within your sphere of
considered
influence over the last
brownfields?
five years?

1

City of Tulare

would estimate 100 acre

2

None

More Likely

2

City of Santa Barbara

15 acres

None

None

More Likely

3

City of Redding

4

City of Sanger

5

City of San Luis Obispo

6

City of National City

7

City of Pittsburg

8

City of Lemoore

9

None
unknown

None

None

Makes no difference

300

None

None

More Likely

3

75%

Makes no difference

d be more that we will no

4

Other

Less than 25%. The ince Makes no difference

25

3

25%

City of Delano

35

None

10

City of Rohnert Park

0

None

None

Makes no difference

11

City of Santa Cruz

Don't know

4

50%

Makes no difference

12

City of Poway

5 or more

None

More Likely

13

City of Livermore

14

Chula Vista/San Diego

15

More Likely
More Likely

10

2

Other

2000

5 or more

All

Makes no difference

City of Gardena

100 acres plus

5 or more

None

More Likely

16

Town of Paradise

10

None

None

More Likely

17

City of Emeryville

200

5 or more

All

Makes no difference

18

City of Pleasant Hill

>10 acres

1

All

19

City of Albany

5

1

None

20

City of Hanford

over 50??????

None

None

Makes no difference

21

City of Huntington Beach

50

1

None

Makes no difference

22

City of Stockton

150

5 or more

All

More Likely

23

City of Santa Fe Springs

250

5 or more

Other

The CDC provides techn Makes no difference

24

City of Novato

0

None

None

not applicable as we don Makes no difference

25

Culver City

4 Acres

2

None

26

City of Ojai

10?

None

None

27

City of Selma

0

None

None

28

Thousand Oaks

mer gas stations parcel.

1

None

Makes no difference

29

City of Dinuba

About 3.5 acres

2

50%

More Likely

30

City of Mt. Shasta

70

None

None

More Likely

31

City of Eureka

70 acres

1

None

More Likely
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assisted in clean up thro

More Likely

More Likely
Will only offer incentives if State or Federal in

More Likely
N/A

More Likely

Local Government
1

City of Tulare

2
3

Based on your
response to the
previous question #13,
why has your
Is there any framework
Has your municipality municipality increased Please use the space
within your
or decreased the
below to describe the municipality, based on
increased or
decreased the amount
amount of incentive
key factors that are
characteristics of a
of incentive packages
packages that are
taken into account
brownfield site, that
offered to private
offered to private
when creating
dictates the type
developers and/or
developers and/or
incentive packages for
and/or amount of
land owners over the land owners over the the redevelopment of
incentive that is
last five years?
last five years?
brownfield sites.
offered?
Please describe
Increased

Offered incentives to maWe do all of the cleanup

No

City of Santa Barbara

Stayed the same

Santa Barbara wants to kPublic or Private use, lev

No

City of Redding

Stayed the same

No

4

City of Sanger

Stayed the same

No

5

City of San Luis Obispo

Stayed the same

NA

6

City of National City

Stayed the same

"Incentive" is perhaps n Same as 14 above.

Yes

7

City of Pittsburg

Stayed the same

We don't offer incentive It really depends on the

No

8

City of Lemoore

Stayed the same

9

City of Delano

10

City of Rohnert Park

Stayed the same

11

City of Santa Cruz

Stayed the same

NA

Proposed use of site; im

Yes

12

City of Poway

Stayed the same

NA

Federal Grants or within

No

13

City of Livermore

Lack of local funds avail Cost, level of clean up, e

Yes

Level of contamination,

14

Chula Vista/San Diego

Stayed the same

Return on investment, pu

No

Case by case

15

City of Gardena

Stayed the same

No

16

Town of Paradise

Stayed the same

Yes

The location of the site is

17

City of Emeryville

Increased

No incentive, no project Project needs gap financ

Yes

Need based regardless

18

City of Pleasant Hill

Stayed the same

First priority is to develo

Yes

Amount of incentive for

19

City of Albany

Stayed the same

Albany is a small city, pr

No

20

City of Hanford

Decreased

21

City of Huntington Beach

Stayed the same

22

City of Stockton

Stayed the same

23

City of Santa Fe Springs

Stayed the same

The CDC has worked wiThe way State redevelop

No

24

City of Novato

Stayed the same

BA

NA

No

25

Culver City

Stayed the same

Matching funds required

No

26

City of Ojai

Stayed the same

n/a

Credible developer with

No

27

City of Selma

Stayed the same

n/a

We have not offered inc

No

28

Thousand Oaks

Stayed the same

City or Agecny has not oIf site would not be rede

No

If site could not be deve

29

City of Dinuba

Decreased

Over the years the State Additional property tax

Yes

RDA has adopted an inv

30

City of Mt. Shasta

31

City of Eureka

Increased

Decreased

City has little to offer as

community economic be

No

In order to stimulate the Return on the investmen

No

Each project is individua

No

no packages offered

prevailing wage trigger we have not done any

No

No incentives provided/NA

No

type of development an

Stayed the same
Decreased

No

No

No
State Prevailing Wage R Development potential,
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We have an EPA Brownf

No

SFS CDC has been invol

Incentive #1
What approximate
Is a fast-tracked or
percentage of
streamlined
Is fast-tracked or
incentive packages
application review
streamlined
that are offered to
process your
application review
private developers or
municipality's
process offered as a
land owners include a
preference over other part of every incentive
fast-tracked or
incentives offered with
package tied to the
streamlined
the redevelopment of
redevelopment of
application review
brownfield sites?
brownfield sites?
process?

Local Government

Is fast-tracked or
streamlined
Has your municipality
application review
offered any type of fast- process used as the
tracked or streamlined primary incentive in
application review
packages that are
process as an incentive
offered with the
for brownfield
redevelopment of
redevelopment?
brownfield sites?

1

City of Tulare

No

2

City of Santa Barbara

No

3

City of Redding

No

4

City of Sanger

Yes

No

No

No

Other (please specify) none

5

City of San Luis Obispo

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

25%

6

City of National City

No

7

City of Pittsburg

No

8

City of Lemoore

No

9

City of Delano

No

10

City of Rohnert Park

No

11

City of Santa Cruz

No

12

City of Poway

No

13

City of Livermore

No

14

Chula Vista/San Diego

No

15

City of Gardena

Yes

It is the only type of inceNo

No

25%

16

Town of Paradise

No

17

City of Emeryville

Yes

No

No

No

75%

18

City of Pleasant Hill

No

19

City of Albany

No

20

City of Hanford

No

21

City of Huntington Beach No

22

City of Stockton

No

No

No

50%

23

City of Santa Fe Springs Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

100%

24

City of Novato

No

25

Culver City

No

26

City of Ojai

No

27

City of Selma

No

28

Thousand Oaks

No

29

City of Dinuba

Yes

No

No

Yes

100%

30

City of Mt. Shasta

Yes

It is the only type of incentive offered

31

City of Eureka

No

Yes

100

50%

Other percentage
amount

Incentive #2

What approximate
Are risk based cleanup
percentage of
standards your
Are risk based cleanup incentive packages
municipality's
standards offered as
that are offered to
preference over other part of every incentive private developers or
incentives offered with
package tied to the
land owners include
the redevelopment of
redevelopment of
risk based cleanup
brownfield sites?
brownfield sites?
standards?

Local Government

Has your municipality Are risk based cleanup
offered any type of risk standards used as the
based clean up
primary incentive in
standards as an
packages that are
incentive for the
offered with the
redevelopment of
redevelopment of
brownfield sites?
brownfield sites?

1

City of Tulare

No

2

City of Santa Barbara

No

3

City of Redding

No

4

City of Sanger

No

5

City of San Luis Obispo

Yes

No

No

No

75%

6

City of National City

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Other (please specify) All projects except hous

7

City of Pittsburg

No

8

City of Lemoore

No

9

City of Delano

No

10

City of Rohnert Park

No

11

City of Santa Cruz

Yes

No

No

No

75%

12

City of Poway

No

13

City of Livermore

No

14

Chula Vista/San Diego

Yes

No

No

Yes

75%

15

City of Gardena

No

16

Town of Paradise

No

17

City of Emeryville

Yes

No

No

Yes

100%

18

City of Pleasant Hill

No

19

City of Albany

No

20

City of Hanford

No

21

City of Huntington Beach No

22

City of Stockton

23

City of Santa Fe Springs No

24

City of Novato

No

25

Culver City

No

26

City of Ojai

No

27

City of Selma

No

28

Thousand Oaks

No

29

City of Dinuba

No

30

City of Mt. Shasta

No

31

City of Eureka

No

Yes

Other percentage
amount

Other (please specify) what is risk based clean

No

No

No
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25%

Incentive #3

Local Government

Has your municipality
offered any type of
relief or
indemnification of
future site cleanup as
an incentive to
redevelop brownfield
sites?

1

City of Tulare

Yes

2

City of Santa Barbara

No

3

City of Redding

No

4

City of Sanger

No

5

City of San Luis Obispo

No

6

City of National City

Yes

7

City of Pittsburg

No

8

City of Lemoore

No

9

City of Delano

No

10

City of Rohnert Park

No

11

City of Santa Cruz

12

Is relief or
Is relief or
indemnification of
indemnification of
future site cleanup
future site cleanup
used as the primary
your municipality's
incentive in packages preference over other
that are offered with incentives offered with
the redevelopment of the redevelopment of
brownfield sites?
brownfield sites?

Is relief or
indemnification of
future site cleanup
offered as a part of
every incentive
package tied to the
redevelopment of
brownfield sites?

What approximate
percentage of
incentive packages
that are offered to
private developers or
land owners include
relief or
indemnification of
future site cleanup?

Other percentage
amount

Yes

No

No

75%

Yes

No

No

Other (please specify) As often as appropriate.

Yes

No

No

No

25%

City of Poway

No

It is the only type of incentive offered

13

City of Livermore

No

14

Chula Vista/San Diego

Yes

15

City of Gardena

No

16

Town of Paradise

No

17

City of Emeryville

Yes

18

City of Pleasant Hill

No

19

City of Albany

No

20

City of Hanford

No

21

City of Huntington Beach No

22

City of Stockton

Yes

No

No

50%

No

No

No

25%

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Other (please specify) 100% Some Polanco Ac

23

City of Santa Fe Springs Yes

N/A

N/A

No

25%

24

City of Novato

No

25

Culver City

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

75%

26

City of Ojai

No

27

City of Selma

No

28

Thousand Oaks

No

No

No

No

Other (please specify) none

29

City of Dinuba

No

30

City of Mt. Shasta

No

31

City of Eureka

No
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Incentive #4

Local Government

Has your municipality
offered any type of tax
breaks to private
developers or land
owners as an incentive
for redevelopment of
brownfield sites?

1

City of Tulare

No

2

City of Santa Barbara

No

3

City of Redding

No

4

City of Sanger

No

5

City of San Luis Obispo

No

6

City of National City

No

7

City of Pittsburg

No

8

City of Lemoore

No

9

City of Delano

Yes

10

City of Rohnert Park

No

11

City of Santa Cruz

No

12

City of Poway

No

13

City of Livermore

No

14

Chula Vista/San Diego

No

15

City of Gardena

No

16

Town of Paradise

No

17

City of Emeryville

Yes

18

City of Pleasant Hill

No

19

City of Albany

No

20

City of Hanford

No

21

City of Huntington Beach No

22

City of Stockton

23

City of Santa Fe Springs Yes - See "Other"

24

City of Novato

No

25

Culver City

No

26

City of Ojai

No

27

City of Selma

No

28

Thousand Oaks

No

29

City of Dinuba

No

30

City of Mt. Shasta

No

31

City of Eureka

No

Are any type of tax
breaks used as the
primary incentive in
packages that are
offered with the
redevelopment of
brownfield sites?

What approximate
Are tax break
percentage of
Are tax breaks your
municipality's
incentives offered as a
incentive packages
preference over other part of every incentive
that are offered to
incentives offered with
package tied to the
private developers or
the redevelopment of
redevelopment of
land owners include
brownfield sites?
brownfield sites?
tax breaks of any type?

Other percentage
amount

No

No

Yes

50%

No

No

No

25%

N/A

N/A

No

Other (please specify) In the past the CDC coul

No

No

No

Other (please specify) none

No
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Incentive #5

Local Government

Is any type of direct
Is any type of direct
Has your municipality
What percentage of
funding assistance
funding assistance
Is direct funding
offered any type of
incentive packages
direct funding
towards remediation
towards remediation
assistance towards
that are offered to
or any other part of
or any other part of
remediation or any
assistance towards
private developers or
remediation or any
development used as
development your
other part of
land owners include
the primary incentive
municipality's
development offered
other part of
any type of direct
development as an
in packages that are preference over other
as a part of every
funding assistance
offered with the
incentives offered with incentive package tied towards remediation
incentive? (Money may
redevelopment of
the redevelopment of to the redevelopment
or any other part of
come from any funding
brownfield sites?
source).
brownfield sites?
of brownfield sites?
development?

1

City of Tulare

Yes

2

City of Santa Barbara

No

3

City of Redding

No

4

City of Sanger

No

5

City of San Luis Obispo

No

6

City of National City

Yes

7

City of Pittsburg

8

City of Lemoore

9

City of Delano

Yes

10

City of Rohnert Park

No

11

City of Santa Cruz

Yes

12

City of Poway

No

13

City of Livermore

Yes

Yes

N/A

No

50%

14

Chula Vista/San Diego

Yes

No

No

No

25%

15

City of Gardena

No

16

Town of Paradise

No

17

City of Emeryville

Yes

No

No

Yes

50%

18

City of Pleasant Hill

No

19

City of Albany

No

20

City of Hanford

21

City of Huntington Beach No

22

City of Stockton

Yes

No

Yes

Other (please specify) 100%

23

City of Santa Fe Springs Yes

No

N/A

No

Other (please specify) See above.

24

City of Novato

25

Culver City

No

26

City of Ojai

No

27

City of Selma

No

28

Thousand Oaks

No

No

No

No

Other (please specify) none

29

City of Dinuba

Yes

No

No

No

25%

30

City of Mt. Shasta

Yes

No

No

No

31

City of Eureka

No

Other percentage
amount

Yes

No

Yes

75%

Yes

No

No

50%

Yes

N/A

N/A

No

Other (please specify) At least 75%. Many of th

Yes

It is the only type of inceYes

No

25%

No

No

No

50%

Yes

No

No

Other (please specify) 5-10%

Yes
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State Funding Assistance

Federal Funding Assistance

Has your municipality
applied for and/or
received any
assistance money from
the federal
government for the
redevelopment of any
brownfield site within
your sphere of
influence?

Local Government

Has your municipality
applied for and/or
received any
assistance money from
the State of California
for the redevelopment
of any brownfield site
within your sphere of
influence?

What approximate
percentage of
brownfield sites has
your municipality
received funding for
from the State of
California?

1

City of Tulare

Yes

50%

2

City of Santa Barbara

Yes

Other

3

City of Redding

Yes

Less than 25%

4

City of Sanger

No

5

City of San Luis Obispo

No

Less than 25%

6

City of National City

Yes

Other

7

City of Pittsburg

No

Other

8

City of Lemoore

Yes

50%

9

City of Delano

Yes

Less than 25%

10

City of Rohnert Park

No

Other

11

City of Santa Cruz

No

Less than 25%

12

City of Poway

No

Other

I don't know

13

City of Livermore

Yes

Other

Borwn field grant from thNo

14

Chula Vista/San Diego

No

15

City of Gardena

No

16

Town of Paradise

17

Other Amount

0%

What approximate
percentage of
brownfield sites has
your municipality
received funding for
from the federal
government?

Yes

50%

No

Other

Yes

Less than 25%

Other Amount

0%

No
No

Less than 25%

30-percent

Yes

Other

This funding was just aw

I can't think of any.

No

Other

I can't think of any.

No

Less than 25%

Yes

Less than 25%

None - We have no browNo

Other

Yes

Less than 25%

No

Other

None -We have no brow

I don't know

Less than 25%

Yes

50%

50%

Yes

25%

No

Less than 25%

No

Less than 25%

City of Emeryville

Yes

Less than 25%

Yes

25%

18

City of Pleasant Hill

No

Less than 25%

No

Less than 25%

19

City of Albany

No

Less than 25%

No

Less than 25%

20

City of Hanford

No

Other

21

City of Huntington Beach No

Less than 25%

Yes

Less than 25%

22

City of Stockton

Less than 25%

Yes

50%

23

City of Santa Fe Springs No

Yes

Less than 25%

24

City of Novato

25

Culver City

Yes

Less than 25%

Yes

Less than 25%

26

City of Ojai

No

Less than 25%

No

Less than 25%

27

City of Selma

No

Less than 25%

No

Less than 25%

28

Thousand Oaks

No

Other

none, State assistance haNo

Other

none, Federal assistance

29

City of Dinuba

Yes

25%

No

Other

0% (none)

30

City of Mt. Shasta

Yes

75%

Yes

75%

31

City of Eureka

Yes

Less than 25%

Yes

Less than 25%

No

Other

0 No

Not applicable
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Other

0

Local Government

Has your municipality
ever taken the
initiative to approach
any private developer
or land owner with an
offer of incentives for
the redevelopment of a
brownfield site?

If yes, has the private
developer or land
owner engaged in the
redevelopment of that
brownfield site due to
the incentive package
that was offered?

1

City of Tulare

Yes

in progress of negotiatinNo

2

City of Santa Barbara

No

No

No

3

City of Redding

No

No

No

4

City of Sanger

No

No

No

5

City of San Luis Obispo

Yes

No

Yes

Yes - Expedited processYes

6

City of National City

Yes

Yes.

Yes

Yes.

7

City of Pittsburg

No

No

No

8

City of Lemoore

Yes

Yes

Yes

9

City of Delano

No

Yes

Yes

10

City of Rohnert Park

No

No

No

11

City of Santa Cruz

Yes

12

City of Poway

No

13

City of Livermore

Yes

yes

No

14

Chula Vista/San Diego

Yes

yes

Yes

15

City of Gardena

No

No

No

16

Town of Paradise

No

No

No

17

City of Emeryville

Yes

sometimes

18

City of Pleasant Hill

Yes

yes

19

City of Albany

No

20

City of Hanford

21

City of Huntington Beach No

22

City of Stockton

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yea

Yes

23

City of Santa Fe Springs Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

That's when the negotiat

24

City of Novato

25

Culver City

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Invocation of the Polanc

26

City of Ojai

No

Yes

No

27

City of Selma

No

No

No

28

Thousand Oaks

No

29

City of Dinuba

Yes

30

City of Mt. Shasta

31

City of Eureka

No.

Has any private
developer or land
owner approached
your municipality
seeking an incentive
package for the
redevelopment of a
brownfield site?

Have any private
developers or land
owners insisted that
your municipality offer
them an incentive
If yes, were any
package for the
incentive packages
redevelopment of a
offered to that private brownfield site and/or
developer or land
stated that they would
owner as a result of
not develop without
Please describe any
their actions?
one?
related circumstances
No

Yes

Yes

We are currently reviewNo

Yes

No

immunity from regulator

No
yes

Yes

Yes

Funding/tax break, reguYes

Yes

yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

NO. Once they evaluateNo

No

No

No

No

No

Yes
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Where the funding gap

No

No

no

Without our assistance th

No

Please describe one or
two examples of
lessons learned from a
past project where a
Would you be willing
brownfield site was (or
to participate in an
was not) redeveloped
interview regarding
based on an incentive the redevelopment of
package offered to the brownfield sites within
private developer or
your sphere of
land owner.
influence?

Local Government

Does your municipality
have any
environmental policies
different to those of the
state or federal
government that
requires stricter
cleanup standards for
brownfield sites?

1

City of Tulare

No

In my experience, the si Yes

2

City of Santa Barbara

No

A site was contaminatedNo

3

City of Redding

No

Yes

4

City of Sanger

No

No

5

City of San Luis Obispo

No

Corporate priorities andNo

6

City of National City

No

The perceived value of bYes

7

City of Pittsburg

No

NA

8

City of Lemoore

No

No

9

City of Delano

No

Problem is dealing with No

10

City of Rohnert Park

No

We have no brownfieldsNo

11

City of Santa Cruz

No

Our main funding sourceYes

12

City of Poway

No

Yes

13

City of Livermore

No

14

Chula Vista/San Diego

No

15

City of Gardena

No

No

16

Town of Paradise

No

Yes

17

City of Emeryville

No

If the municipal govt (Ci Yes

18

City of Pleasant Hill

No

Yes

19

City of Albany

No

Yes

20

City of Hanford

No

No

21

City of Huntington Beach No

No

22

City of Stockton

23

City of Santa Fe Springs Yes

24

City of Novato

25

Culver City

26

City of Ojai

27

City of Selma

No

n/a

No

28

Thousand Oaks

No

none to offer.

No

29

City of Dinuba

No

Developers will not dev No

30

City of Mt. Shasta

No

No

31

City of Eureka

No

Please describe

No

No
Begin with the end in mi Yes

No

Redeveloping BrownfielYes
Because SFS is part of anEach project stands on i Yes

No

Yes
The City depends on theI'm sure the site would dNo

The cost of remediation Yes
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Respondent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Raw Data
Mid Range of
Brownfield Sites
Within SOI

City of Tulare
City of Santa Barbara
City of Redding
City of Sanger
City of San Luis Obispo
City of National City
City of Pittsburg
City of Lemoore
City of Delano
City of Rohnert Park
City of Santa Cruz
City of Poway
City of Livermore
Chula Vista/San Diego
City of Gardena
Town of Paradise
City of Emeryville
City of Pleasant Hill
City of Albany
City of Hanford
City of Huntington Beach
City of Stockton
City of Santa Fe Springs
City of Novato
Culver City
City of Ojai
City of Selma
Thousand Oaks
City of Dinuba
City of Mt. Shasta
City of Eureka

Number of
Redeveloped
Sites

Percentage of
Redeveloped
Sites

15
5
15
5
5
35
15
5
5
0
35
35
35
51
51
5
51
5
5
5
5
35
51
0
5
5
0
5
5
5
5

2
0
0
0
0
3
4
3
0
0
4
5
2
5
5
0
5
1
1
0
1
5
5
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
1

13.33%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
8.57%
26.67%
60.00%
0.00%
0.00%
11.43%
14.29%
5.71%
9.80%
9.80%
0.00%
9.80%
20.00%
20.00%
0.00%
20.00%
14.29%
9.80%
0.00%
40.00%
0.00%
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
0.00%
20.00%

504

57

Mean =

108

11.31%

Ranked Data

Respondent
8
25
29
7
18
19
21
28
31
12
22
1
11
14
15
17
23
6
13
2
3
4
5
9
10
16
20
24
26
27
30

City of Lemoore
Culver City
City of Dinuba
City of Pittsburg
City of Pleasant Hill
City of Albany
City of Huntington Beach
Thousand Oaks
City of Eureka
City of Poway
City of Stockton
City of Tulare
City of Santa Cruz
Chula Vista/San Diego
City of Gardena
City of Emeryville
City of Santa Fe Springs
City of National City
City of Livermore
City of Santa Barbara
City of Redding
City of Sanger
City of San Luis Obispo
City of Delano
City of Rohnert Park
Town of Paradise
City of Hanford
City of Novato
City of Ojai
City of Selma
City of Mt. Shasta
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Rate of
Redevelopment

Rank

60.00%
40.00%
40.00%
26.67%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
14.29%
14.29%
13.33%
11.43%
9.80%
9.80%
9.80%
9.80%
8.57%
5.71%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

1
2
2
4
5
5
5
5
5
10
10
12
13
14
14
14
14
18
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

Standard Deviation

Score (Xi)

Deviations (Xi ‐ X)

Deviations2

60.00%
40.00%
40.00%
26.67%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
14.29%
14.29%
13.33%
11.43%
9.80%
9.80%
9.80%
9.80%
8.57%
5.71%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

47.95%
27.95%
27.95%
14.62%
7.95%
7.95%
7.95%
7.95%
7.95%
2.24%
2.24%
1.28%
‐0.62%
‐2.24%
‐2.24%
‐2.24%
‐2.24%
‐3.48%
‐6.33%
‐12.05%
‐12.05%
‐12.05%
‐12.05%
‐12.05%
‐12.05%
‐12.05%
‐12.05%
‐12.05%
‐12.05%
‐12.05%
‐12.05%

22.99%
7.81%
7.81%
2.14%
0.63%
0.63%
0.63%
0.63%
0.63%
0.05%
0.05%
0.02%
0.00%
0.05%
0.05%
0.05%
0.05%
0.12%
0.40%
1.45%
1.45%
1.45%
1.45%
1.45%
1.45%
1.45%
1.45%
1.45%
1.45%
1.45%
1.45%

373.50%

0.00%

62.18%

X=

12.05%

Variance =

2.07%

Standard Deviation =

14.40%

N‐1 used as the denominator because
this is for a random sample
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Respondent
City of Lemoore
Culver City
City of Dinuba
City of Pittsburg
City of Pleasant Hill
City of Albany
City of Huntington Beach
Thousand Oaks
City of Eureka
City of Poway
City of Stockton
City of Tulare
City of Santa Cruz
Chula Vista/San Diego
City of Gardena
City of Emeryville
City of Santa Fe Springs
City of National City
City of Livermore
City of Santa Barbara
City of Redding
City of Sanger
City of San Luis Obispo
City of Delano
City of Rohnert Park
Town of Paradise
City of Hanford
City of Novato
City of Ojai
City of Selma
City of Mt. Shasta
Percentiles
95th
90th
75th
60th
55th
50th
45th
40th

Rate
60.00%
40.00%
40.00%
26.67%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
14.29%
14.29%
13.33%
11.43%
9.80%
9.80%
9.80%
9.80%
8.57%
5.71%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

Respondent
Population
City of Stockton
243,771
City of Huntington Beach
189,594
Chula Vista/San Diego
173,556
Thousand Oaks
117,005
City of Santa Barbara
92,325
City of Redding
80,865
City of Livermore
73,345
City of Gardena
57,746
City of Pittsburg
56,769
City of Santa Cruz
54,593
City of National City
54,260
City of Poway
48,044
City of Novato
47,630
City of San Luis Obispo
44,174
City of Tulare
43,994
City of Rohnert Park
42,236
City of Hanford
41,686
City of Delano
38,824
Culver City
38,816
City of Pleasant Hill
32,837
Town of Paradise
26,408
City of Eureka
26,128
City of Lemoore
19,712
City of Selma
19,444
City of Sanger
18,931
City of Santa Fe Springs
17,438
City of Dinuba
16,844
City of Albany
16,444
City of Ojai
7,862
City of Emeryville
6,882
City of Mt. Shasta
3,621
1,751,784
95th
90th
75th
60th
55th
50th
45th
40th

40.00%
26.67%
20.00%
11.43%
9.80%
9.80%
9.19%
5.71%

181,575
117,005
57,258
47,630
44,084
42,236
40,255
38,816

33871648
5.17%
56,509
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Respondent
Households
City of Stockton
78,556
City of Huntington Beach
73,657
Chula Vista/San Diego
57,705
Thousand Oaks
41,793
City of Santa Barbara
35,605
City of Redding
32,103
City of Livermore
26,123
City of Santa Cruz
20,442
City of Gardena
20,324
City of San Luis Obispo
18,639
City of Novato
18,524
City of Pittsburg
17,741
Culver City
16,611
City of Rohnert Park
15,503
City of Poway
15,467
City of National City
15,018
City of Hanford
13,931
City of Pleasant Hill
13,753
City of Tulare
13,543
Town of Paradise
11,591
City of Eureka
10,957
City of Delano
8,409
City of Albany
7,011
City of Lemoore
6,450
City of Selma
5,596
City of Sanger
5,220
City of Santa Fe Springs
4,834
City of Dinuba
4,493
City of Emeryville
3,975
City of Ojai
3,068
City of Mt. Shasta
1,669

95th
90th
75th
60th
55th
50th
45th
40th

Respondent
Income
Thousand Oaks
$76,815
City of Livermore
$75,322
City of Poway
$71,708
City of Pleasant Hill
$67,489
City of Huntington Beach $64,824
City of Novato
$63,453
City of Albany
$54,919
City of Rohnert Park
$51,942
Culver City
$51,792
City of Santa Cruz
$50,605
City of Pittsburg
$50,557
City of Santa Barbara
$47,498
City of Emeryville
$45,359
Chula Vista/San Diego
$44,861
City of Ojai
$44,593
City of Santa Fe Springs
$44,540
City of Lemoore
$40,314
City of Gardena
$38,988
City of Hanford
$37,582
City of Stockton
$35,453
City of Selma
$34,713
City of Redding
$34,194
City of Tulare
$33,637
City of Dinuba
$33,345
City of Sanger
$32,072
City of San Luis Obispo
$31,926
Town of Paradise
$31,863
City of National City
$29,826
City of Delano
$28,143
City of Mt. Shasta
$26,500
City of Eureka
$25,849

95th
90th
75th
60th
55th
50th
45th
40th

65,681
41,793
20,383
16,611
15,485
15,018
13,842
13,543
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$73,515
$67,489
$51,867
$45,359
$44,727
$44,540
$39,651
$37,582

Respondent
City of Santa Barbara
City of Santa Cruz
City of Novato
City of Albany
Thousand Oaks
City of Livermore
City of Huntington Beach
Culver City
City of Pleasant Hill
City of Poway
City of San Luis Obispo
City of Ojai
City of Rohnert Park
Chula Vista/San Diego
City of Gardena
City of Santa Fe Springs
City of Pittsburg
City of Emeryville
City of National City
Town of Paradise
City of Mt. Shasta
City of Redding
City of Stockton
City of Eureka
City of Lemoore
City of Hanford
City of Selma
City of Dinuba
City of Tulare
City of Sanger
City of Delano

95th
90th
75th
60th
55th
50th
45th
40th
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Median House
Value
$479,800
$411,900
$381,400
$334,800
$324,800
$314,600
$311,800
$311,100
$294,000
$284,200
$278,800
$272,100
$237,300
$197,000
$179,500
$169,400
$165,100
$161,600
$141,500
$129,100
$124,800
$121,600
$119,500
$114,000
$110,900
$102,900
$97,000
$97,000
$94,700
$92,200
$86,700

$396,650
$334,800
$302,550
$237,300
$188,250
$169,400
$163,350
$141,500

Respondent
City of Lemoore
Culver City
City of Dinuba
City of Pittsburg
City of Pleasant Hill
City of Albany
City of Huntington Beach
Thousand Oaks
City of Eureka
City of Poway
City of Stockton
City of Tulare
City of Santa Cruz
Chula Vista/San Diego
City of Gardena
City of Emeryville
City of Santa Fe Springs
City of National City
City of Livermore
City of Santa Barbara
City of Redding
City of Sanger
City of San Luis Obispo
City of Delano
City of Rohnert Park
Town of Paradise
City of Hanford
City of Novato
City of Ojai
City of Selma
City of Mt. Shasta

Rank
1
2
2
4
5
5
5
5
5
10
10
12
13
14
14
14
14
18
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

Population
23
19
27
9
20
28
2
4
22
12
1
15
3
11
8
30
26
10
7
5
6
25
14
18
16
21
17
13
29
24
31

Households
24
13
28
12
18
23
2
4
21
15
1
19
3
16
9
29
27
8
7
5
6
26
10
22
14
20
17
11
30
25
31
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Income
17
9
24
11
4
7
5
1
31
3
20
23
14
28
18
13
16
10
2
12
22
25
26
29
8
27
19
6
15
21
30

Median House
Value
25
8
28
17
9
4
7
5
24
10
23
29
14
19
15
18
16
2
6
1
22
30
11
31
13
20
26
3
12
27
21

Rate
60.00%
40.00%
40.00%
26.67%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
14.29%
14.29%
13.33%
11.43%
9.80%
9.80%
9.80%
9.80%
8.57%
5.71%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

Population
19,712
38,816
16,844
56,769
32,837
16,444
189,594
117,005
26,128
48,044
243,771
43,994
54,593
173,556
57,746
6,882
17,438
54,260
73,345
92,325
80,865
18,931
44,174
38,824
42,236
26,408
41,686
47,630
7,862
19,444
3,621

Households
6,450
16,611
4,493
17,741
13,753
7,011
73,657
41,793
10,957
15,467
78,556
13,543
20,442
57,705
20,324
3,975
4,834
15,018
26,123
35,605
32,103
5,220
18,639
8,409
15,503
11,591
13,931
18,524
3,068
5,596
1,669
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Income
$40,314
$51,792
$33,345
$50,557
$67,489
$54,919
$64,824
$76,815
$25,849
$71,708
$35,453
$33,637
$50,605
$44,861
$38,988
$45,359
$44,540
$29,826
$75,322
$47,498
$34,194
$32,072
$31,926
$28,143
$51,942
$31,863
$37,582
$63,453
$44,593
$34,713
$26,500

Median House
Value
$110,900
$311,100
$97,000
$165,100
$294,000
$334,800
$311,800
$324,800
$114,000
$284,200
$119,500
$94,700
$411,900
$197,000
$179,500
$161,600
$169,400
$141,500
$314,600
$479,800
$121,600
$92,200
$278,800
$86,700
$237,300
$129,100
$102,900
$381,400
$272,100
$97,000
$124,800

Respondent
City of Lemoore
Culver City
City of Dinuba
City of Pittsburg
City of Pleasant Hill
City of Albany
City of Huntington Beach
Thousand Oaks
City of Eureka
City of Poway
City of Stockton
City of Tulare
City of Santa Cruz
Chula Vista/San Diego
City of Gardena
City of Emeryville
City of Santa Fe Springs
City of National City
City of Livermore
City of Santa Barbara
City of Redding
City of Sanger
City of San Luis Obispo
City of Delano
City of Rohnert Park
Town of Paradise
City of Hanford
City of Novato
City of Ojai
City of Selma
City of Mt. Shasta

Area
8.50
5.13
3.40
16.82
7.10
5.50
31.60
55.00
14.40
39.30
75.10
16.70
15.60
51.20
5.82
1.90
8.90
9.20
24.10
41.40
59.60
4.70
10.80
10.20
6.43
18.20
13.10
28.30
4.40
4.30
3.70

California 163,696
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Respondent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

City of Lemoore
Culver City
City of Dinuba
City of Pittsburg
City of Pleasant Hill
City of Albany
City of Huntington Beach
Thousand Oaks
City of Eureka
City of Poway
City of Stockton
City of Tulare
City of Santa Cruz
Chula Vista/San Diego
City of Gardena
City of Emeryville
City of Santa Fe Springs
City of National City
City of Livermore
City of Santa Barbara
City of Redding
City of Sanger
City of San Luis Obispo
City of Delano
City of Rohnert Park
Town of Paradise
City of Hanford
City of Novato
City of Ojai
City of Selma
City of Mt. Shasta

Ranked Rate of
Redevelopment

Rate of
Redevelopment

1
2
2
4
5
5
5
5
5
10
10
12
13
14
14
14
14
18
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

60.00%
40.00%
40.00%
26.67%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
20.00%
14.29%
14.29%
13.33%
11.43%
9.80%
9.80%
9.80%
9.80%
8.57%
5.71%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
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Local
Government
Offers Incentive
Type 1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

Respondent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

City of Lemoore
Culver City
City of Dinuba
City of Pittsburg
City of Pleasant Hill
City of Albany
City of Huntington Beach
Thousand Oaks
City of Eureka
City of Poway
City of Stockton
City of Tulare
City of Santa Cruz
Chula Vista/San Diego
City of Gardena
City of Emeryville
City of Santa Fe Springs
City of National City
City of Livermore
City of Santa Barbara
City of Redding
City of Sanger
City of San Luis Obispo
City of Delano
City of Rohnert Park
Town of Paradise
City of Hanford
City of Novato
City of Ojai
City of Selma
City of Mt. Shasta

Local
Local
Local
Government
Government
Government
Offers Incentive Offers Incentive Offers Incentive
Type 3
Type 4
Type 2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Respondent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

City of Lemoore
Culver City
City of Dinuba
City of Pittsburg
City of Pleasant Hill
City of Albany
City of Huntington Beach
Thousand Oaks
City of Eureka
City of Poway
City of Stockton
City of Tulare
City of Santa Cruz
Chula Vista/San Diego
City of Gardena
City of Emeryville
City of Santa Fe Springs
City of National City
City of Livermore
City of Santa Barbara
City of Redding
City of Sanger
City of San Luis Obispo
City of Delano
City of Rohnert Park
Town of Paradise
City of Hanford
City of Novato
City of Ojai
City of Selma
City of Mt. Shasta

Local
Government
Offers Incentive
Type 5
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

Sought State
Funding
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

Applied State
Funding
50%
12.50%
25%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
12.50%
0%
0%
50%
0%
0%
0%
12.50%
0%
30%
100%
0%
12.50%
0%
0%
12.50%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

* Mt Shasta
indicated that
they applied
state funding to
75% of sites but
also entered that
0 sites had been
redeveloped
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Respondent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

City of Lemoore
Culver City
City of Dinuba
City of Pittsburg
City of Pleasant Hill
City of Albany
City of Huntington Beach
Thousand Oaks
City of Eureka
City of Poway
City of Stockton
City of Tulare
City of Santa Cruz
Chula Vista/San Diego
City of Gardena
City of Emeryville
City of Santa Fe Springs
City of National City
City of Livermore
City of Santa Barbara
City of Redding
City of Sanger
City of San Luis Obispo
City of Delano
City of Rohnert Park
Town of Paradise
City of Hanford
City of Novato
City of Ojai
City of Selma
City of Mt. Shasta

Sought Federal Applied Federal
Funding
Funding
0
0%
1
12.50%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
1
12.50%
0
0%
1
12.50%
0
0%
1
50%
1
50%
1
12.50%
1
50%
1
25%
1
25%
1
12.50%
1
Undetermined
0
0%
0
0%
1
12.50%
0
0%
0
0%
1
12.50%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
1
0%
** Mt Shasta
indicated that
they applied
federal funding
to 75% of sites
but also entered
that 0 sites had
been
redeveloped
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Local
Government
Approached
Developer /
Land Owner
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Respondent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

City of Lemoore
Culver City
City of Dinuba
City of Pittsburg
City of Pleasant Hill
City of Albany
City of Huntington Beach
Thousand Oaks
City of Eureka
City of Poway
City of Stockton
City of Tulare
City of Santa Cruz
Chula Vista/San Diego
City of Gardena
City of Emeryville
City of Santa Fe Springs
City of National City
City of Livermore
City of Santa Barbara
City of Redding
City of Sanger
City of San Luis Obispo
City of Delano
City of Rohnert Park
Town of Paradise
City of Hanford
City of Novato
City of Ojai
City of Selma
City of Mt. Shasta

Land Owner /
Developer
Approached
Local
Government
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
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Local
Government Has
Stricter Cleanup
Standards
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Appendix E: Statistical Tables

STATISTICAL TABLES
Table 4
Correlation Between Different Incentive Types

Fast-Tracked

Pearson Correlation

Fast-Tracked

Risk Based

Liability

Project Review

Cleanup

Relief

1.000

Direct Funding
Tax Breaks

Assistance

.271

.158

.145

.246

.141

.397

.436

.183

Project
Review

Risk Based

Significance

Number

31

31

31

31

31

Pearson Correlation

.271

1.000

.644**

.204

.411*

Significance

.141

.000

.272

.022

Number

31

31

31

31

31

Pearson Correlation

.158

.644**

1.000

.145

.545**

Significance

.397

.000

.436

.002

Number

31

31

31

31

31

Pearson Correlation

.145

.204

.145

1.000

.309

Significance

.436

.272

.436

Number

31

31

31

31

31

Pearson Correlation

.246

.411*

.545**

.309

1.000

Significance

.183

.022

.002

.091

Number

31

31

31

31

Cleanup

Liability
Relief

Tax Breaks

Direct

.091

Funding
Assistance

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 5
Correlation Between Rate of Redevelopment and Different Incentive Types
Fast-Tracked

Rate of
Redevelopment

Pearson
Correlation

Rate of

Project

Risk Based

Liability

Redevelopment

Review

Cleanup

Relief

1.000

Significance

Number

Direct
Funding
Tax Breaks

Assistance

-.066

-.106

.107

-.133

.244

.724

.570

.565

.477

.187

31

31

31

31

31

31
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Table 6
Correlation Between Demographic Variables and Incentives

Population

Pearson Correlation

Sig. (2-tailed)

N
Households

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Income

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Median

Pearson Correlation

House

Sig. (2-tailed)

Value

N

Streamlined

Risk Based

Project Review

Cleanup

Direct Funding
Liability Relief

Tax Breaks

Assistance

-.058

.356*

.244

-.162

.082

.759

.050

.185

.385

.659

31

31

31

31

31

-.085

.320

.198

-.190

-.001

.651

.079

.286

.307

.995

31

31

31

31

31

-.371*

-.185

-.129

-.152

-.220

.040

.318

.491

.414

.235

31

31

31

31

31

-.316

.033

-.055

-.210

-.330

.083

.859

.768

.256

.070

31

31

31

31

31
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Table 7
Correlation Between Rate of Redevelopment and Demographic Variables
Median
Rate of

Median House

Redevelopment

Rate of
Redevelopment

Pearson Correlation

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

N

31
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Population

Households

Income

Value

.009

.010

.163

-.045

.960

.957

.381

.809

31

31

31

31

Table 8
Correlation Between Incentives and Other Contextual Variables
Framework

Incentive1

State

Federal

Approaches

Approaches

Cleanup

Incentives

Funding

Funding

Developer

Government

Standards

.205

.246

.057

.310

Sig. (2-tailed)

.511

.938

.267

.183

.759

.090

31

31

31

31

31

31

-.425*

-.054

.376*

.576**

.540**

-.089

.017

.773

.037

.001

.002

.632

31

31

31

31

31

31

-.353

.137

.650**

.694**

.354

.310

.052

.463

.000

.000

.051

.090

31

31

31

31

31

31

-.228

.330

.289

.043

.289

-.048

.218

.069

.114

.819

.114

.798

31

31

31

31

31

31

-.245

.398*

.411*

.603**

.280

.215

.184

.026

.022

.000

.128

.246

31

31

31

31

31

31

Pearson Correlation

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Incentive 5

For

-.015

N

Incentive 4

Stricter

.123

Sig. (2-tailed)

Incentive 3

Developer

Pearson Correlation

N
Incentive 2

Government

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 9
Correlation Between Rate of Redevelopment and Other Contextual Variables
Government
Approaches
Rate

Rate of

State

Federal

For Incentives

Funding

Funding

Developer

Stricter

Approaches

Cleanup

Government

Standards

.297

.247

-.008

.397*

.134

-.029

.105

.180

.964

.027

.472

.877

31

31

31

31

31

31

31

Pearson Correlation

.297

1.000

-.119

-.229

-.104

-.090

.038

Sig. (2-tailed)

.105

.522

.215

.577

.631

.839

Pearson Correlation

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

N
Framework

Framework

Developer

For Incentives

N

31

31

31

31

31

31

31

1.000

.343

.264

-.056

-.145

.059

.151

.766

.436

State

Pearson Correlation

.247

-.119

Funding

Sig. (2-tailed)

.180

.522

31

31

31

31

31

31

31

-.008

-.229

.343

1.000

.280

.349

.201

.964

.215

.059

.128

.055

.278

31

31

31

31

31

31

31

Pearson Correlation

.397*

-.104

.264

.280

1.000

.411*

.215

Sig. (2-tailed)

.027

.577

.151

.128

.022

.246

31

31

31

31

31

31

N
Federal

Pearson Correlation

Funding
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Government
Approaches
Developer

N

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 9 - Continued
Correlation Between Rate of Redevelopment and Other Contextual Variables
Government
Rate

Framework

State

Federal

For Incentives

Funding

Funding

Approaches
Developer

Developer

Developer

Stricter

Approaches

Cleanup

Government

Standards

Pearson Correlation

.134

-.090

-.056

.349

.411*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.472

.631

.766

.055

.022

31

31

31

31

31

31

31

-.029

.038

-.145

.201

.215

.201

1.000

.877

.839

.436

.278

.246

.278

31

31

31

31

31

31

1.000

.201

Approaches
Government

N
Stricter

Pearson Correlation

.278

Cleanup
Standards

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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